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Abstract
CAPGRAS' SYNDROME 
by
Robert J. Berson 
Advisor: Professor Harold Wilensky
Capgras* Syndrome, the delusion of doubles, is a rare 
delusional phenomenon in which a person believes that 
identical doubles have replaced significant people in 
his life and/or that there exist identical doubles of 
himself. These delusional doubles are almost always 
believed to be malevolent. The delusion occurs in a 
variety of psychotic states, usually schizophrenia.
It occurs in both women and men in a wide age range.
This dissertation reviews early French reports by Capgras 
and his associates as well as over 100 cases reported 
in English. Previous efforts to explain the Syndrome 
have stressed both organic and psychodynamic factors.
The Syndrome has been observed with many organic con­
ditions, but the allegation of doubles is selective, 
the problem is not misrecognition but belief, thus 
psychodynamic factors must be significant. Psycho­
dynamic explanations have emphasized four major themes:
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VOedipal problems in women, feelings of strangeness, 
intolerable ambivalence, and pathological splitting.
An approach to the delusion based on object relations 
theory seems most comprehensive, because it is the 
manner in which images of self and others are intern­
alized that appears to underlie the delusion. For 
Capgras’ Syndrome to develop there must be paranoid 
characteristics, a psychotic state, and, I suggest, 
severe disturbances in early internalized object 
relations. The case presented here illustrates the 
application of an object relations approach to the 
history of a 32 year old woman who believed that her 
mother, uncle, and cousin (her only living relatives) 
had been replaced by doubles and that there were two 
doubles of herself. This woman experienced inadequate 
mothering in infancy, became an isolated and aloof 
adolescent, and suffered the onset of a schizophrenic 
illness in her mid-twenties, just after completion of 
medical school. Capgras' Syndrome is a frightening yet 
uncannily familiar phenomenon. The idea of doubles has 
long had a place in human religion and literature, and 
to make the Syndrome more conprehensible and thus more 
treatable it is appropriate to examine the use of the 
idea of doubles in fiction. It is also useful to build 
a continuum from the psychotic delusion of doubles through 
the neurotic "family romance" toward a recognition of 
similar dynamics in normal life.
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1I
Introduction
In early July of 1979 a young woman was admitted to 
the psychiatry service of the large urban hospital where 
I had begun my interneship in clinical psychology. She 
said that her mother had died earlier that week and that 
she had become "despondent" and tried to jump out a window 
(she was restrained by a friend) after hearing voices 
telling her to join her mother. She resisted the idea of 
hospitalization at first, but with minimal persuasion she 
agreed to a voluntary admission. The woman, Ms. F., said 
she was a single, Jewish woman of 32 who had lived alone 
with her mother since her father's death seven years before. 
She told us that her parents had been hidden during the 
Holocaust, she herself had been born in 1947 in Austria, 
and the family had come to the United States in 1949. She 
said she had attended a public high school and city college, 
then worked for a credit firm until her father's death, 
when her inheritance enabled her to stop working. Since 
then, she said, she had occupied herself by visiting mu­
seums, attending concerts, and reading. There were no 
siblings and no living relatives. "I am used to my
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2solitude," she said in response to a question, "and I 
feel all will be well— I feel an inner strength. . .1 
have no functional problems, the voices were a transient 
aberration; the admission was inappropriate." She was 
dirty and unkempt, her mood depressed and her affect strik­
ingly flat. She was fully oriented, alert, and clearly 
well educated. There were no obvious defects in memory 
or cognition. She was diagnosed as suffering a psychotic 
depression and started on a low dose of neuroleptic medi­
cation.
For several days she repeated her story to a sympa­
thetic staff. Then, with no apparent reason, she began to 
tell a different story. She told us that she had graduated 
from a local medical school, had during her residency un­
willingly become part of a five-year psychoanalytic film 
study in which her entire life had been filmed, had sued 
for invasion of privacy and had been awarded five huxidrdd 
million dollars, but had then been "incarcerated” at a near­
by state hospital by the "film director-psychologists" who 
wanted the money for themselves. She had escaped from the 
hospital, lived with a man she picked up on the street, 
then come to the West Side of Manhattan where she "engaged 
in sexual deviancy with several men for the profit of the 
film director-psychologists."
We on staff were convinced that the story of filmed 
studies and law suits was delusional, but we gradually were 
struck by an awareness that we had believed the first story
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3without obtaining any evidence other than the words of 
Ms. F. herself. When we discovered that she had given a 
false address, we realized that there were two "crazy" 
stories and that we knew nothing of our patient’s "real" 
life. It was at about that time, a week or so after her 
arrival on the ward, that Ms. F. added that the "film 
director-psychologists" had put a "double" in her place to 
collect the five hundred million dollars and that while 
her "real mother" had died long ago, an "imposter mother" 
was alive, living in a nursing home, and was a "double" of 
her real mother. It was at this point that we realized 
that our patient suffered from the delusion of doubles 
first described by Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux in 1923.
In this essay I will attempt to achieve an understand­
ing of Capgras’ Syndrome through a review of the litera­
ture and a discussion of the patient I treated. I will 
first define the syndrome, review the psychological litera­
ture, and present the explanatory hypotheses that have 
been suggested. In discussing the explanatory hypotheses 
I will indicate their inadequacies and suggest an explana­
tory hypothesis based in object relations theory. I will 
then present the data of the case of Ms. F., concluding 
with an application of the object relations approach to 
her illness. Finally, I will attempt to place Capgras’ 
Syndrome in a broader context, looking for its roots and 
analogues in both normal and neurotic experience and in 
fiction as well, and examining the implications of my in­
quiry for both further research and effective treatment.
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4There are significant limitations to this study. 
Capgras’ Syndrome is a relatively rare phenomenon (See 
Appendix for a list of cases reported in English language 
literature), and I am able to discuss only one case in 
detail. The data for my case are themselves limited, for 
my patient was as highly guarded as she was severely ill, 
and the external sources of data I eventually encountered 
were so deeply distressed by Ms. F. ’s illness that I de­
cided not to press them. The data from the professional 
literature are often sparse as well, especially with re­
gard to information about the early life experiences of 
the patients described. Thus I must construct a hypotheti­
cal argument on less than adequate data. Recognizing 
these limits, however, I believe that a heuristic essay 
thoroughly examining, as I have done, as much of the liter­
ature as possible, can provide the basis for the better 
understanding and treatment of patients presenting the 
delusion of doubles.
Ms. F. was one of the first patients of my interneship 
year. The tragedies of her history, her illness, and her 
death made my experience with her an unforgettable encoun­
ter. (See Chapter III.) It became an absorbing personal 
commitment to try to learn about the Syndrome, to uncover 
especially the earliest reports, and to struggle with the 
explanations offered— explanations at first so convincing, 
but then so obviously incomplete. I felt I owed it to her 
at least to understand better. There is another reason
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5as well for this essay. The tragic waste of life, in­
fluenced at least in part by the horror of the Holocaust, 
should not be permitted to go untold. The story should 
be spoken.
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6II
Capgras' Syndrome
"The Capgras’ Syndrome," write Enoch, Trethowan, and 
Barker (1967), "is a rare, colorful syndrome in which the 
patient believes that a person, usually closely related to 
him, has been replaced by an exact double."(p.1) The 
syndrome is indeed rare— I have been able to discover, 
utilizing computer searches as well as texts, only about 
124 case reports in the English language literature. (See 
Appendix.) Foreign language sources are harder to unearth, 
but I have obtained the first three case reports by Capgras 
and his associates as well as French accounts of approxi­
mately 25 cases reported from 1923 to 1962. Citations in 
the more recent French papers indicate that the total num­
ber of cases in the French literature is also small— I have 
located citations indicating approximately 50 reports.
(An indirect indication of the rarity of the syndrome may 
be taken from the eagerness with which so colorful a syn­
drome is reported: the appearance of the syndrome is so 
dramatic that nearly everyone who has had contact with it 
seems to write an article; most of the articles are unim­
pressive, offering little more than description, and some 
of the articles report cases that fail to meet the descrip­
tive diagnostic criteria. Lansky (1974) comments: "The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7clinical presentation is so striking it is unlikely that 
the syndrome occurs frequently and is overlooked-"(p.363)
If so eagerly reported a syndrome has produced so few pub­
lished articles, one may, I think, assume its relative 
rarity.)
Arieti and Meth offer the following definition and
description of Capgras' Syndrome in the first edition of
The American Handbook of Psychiatry (1959):
The phenomenon (or syndrome) described by Capgras is 
the following: the patient will claim, on meeting some­
one he knows well, that the person is a double or an 
impostor who has assumed this person’s appearance.
For example, the mother of a female patient comes to 
visit the patient at the hospital. The patient claims 
that this visitor is not the mother but either a double 
of her or an impostor who has tried to assume the 
appearance of the mother in order to deceive the patient. 
The phenomenon is this complicated type of misidentifi- 
cation, much more characteristic and specific than the 
usual misidentifications occurr.±®gin schizophrenia.
(Vol. I,p.548)
The descriptions offered both by Enoch, Trethowan and Bar­
ker and by Arieti and Meth are incomplete, for the first 
patient described by Capgras not only claimed that there 
were doubles of significant other people in her life, but 
also claimed that there were doubles of herself.(Capgras 
and Reboul-Lachaux, 1923) One reason for this descriptive 
incompleteness may lie in Arieti and Meth's use of sources. 
Arieti and Meth cite a report in Annales Medico-Psycholo- 
giques which is actually a two paragraph summary of a full 
ten page report in the Bulletin de la Societe Clinique de 
Medicine Mentale. The summary does not mention the patient’s 
belief in doubles of herself; the full paper speaks at length
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8about this symptom. Many other authors whose papers I
have read also cite the summary rather than the full re­
port. While most patients claim that there are doubles 
of others, some— including the original patient— claim 
that there are doubles of themselves as well. It might 
be wise, then, to define the Capgras’ Syndrome as the de­
lusional belief in the existence of identical doubles of 
others and/or of oneself.
The first report of a patient with this delusion is the
report of Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux (1923) already men­
tioned. (Earlier descriptions of the delusion by Bessiere, 
Janet, and Magnan are reported by Todd, Dewhurst, and Wallis, 
1981.) Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux entitled their report 
"L'Illusion des 'Sosies' dans une Delire Systematise Chro- 
nique” or "The Illusion of Doubles in a Chronic Systematized 
Delirium." (Sosie is the French word for double. It is 
derived from the name Sosia; Sosia was the servant of Am­
phitryon in Plautus' play Amphitryon, in which Mercury im­
personated Sosia. In Greek mythology impersonations and 
transformations are not uncommon. Indeed, Zeus himself 
impersonated Amphitryon in order to sleep with his wife 
Alcmena; Alcmena conceived by Zeus her son, Heracles.)
Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux chose to speak of the phenomenon 
"after the manner of the patient"(p.12) who herself used 
the word "sosie."
The patient was a woman of 53 at the time of the re­
port. She had married at 29 and had one living child,
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9a daughter of 20; four other children had died at birth 
or in infancy. Her husband stated that she had been in a 
"nervous state” beginning three or four years after their 
marriage (she would have been 33 or 34 and had lost two 
children); her state became more severe after the deaths of 
her twin sons when she was 37. Her early symptoms included 
hearing the moaning of children from under the ground, 
which led to a belief that there were hidden caverns beneath 
the streets of Paris filled with kidnapped children.
Several years later she told her husband that he was an 
impostor, a double. Little is told of her early history 
(a difficulty with most case reports of Capgras’ Syndrome), 
save that she had attended school to the age of 14, then 
worked as a seamstress. Her delusions seemed to have been 
systematized and fixed from about the age 44 on. These 
delusions consisted of ideas of grandeur (that she was the 
kidnapped daughter of aristocrats), ideas of persecution 
(her princely fortune was being stolen, people were trying 
to poison her), and the belief in doubles.
In addition to believing that her husband had been 
replaced by a double, she asserted that three of her dead 
children had not died but had been carried away and replaced 
by (dead) doubles. (The other child had been poisoned, she 
said.) Furthermore, doubles had replaced her concierge, 
her domestic servants, tenants in her building, and so on. 
Police officers too had been replaced by impostors (frustra­
ting her efforts, she claimed, to bring these matters to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the attention of the authorities) as well as doctors, 
staff, and patients in the hospital. In addition, she 
asserted that "she (herself) had two or three doubles of 
which she knew."(p.8) These doubles of herself were part 
of the plot to forge her papers and steal her fortune and 
to have her held in captivity. "How is it possible that 
such an illusion be born and develop?" ask Capgras and 
Reboul-Lachaux.(p.13) To answer their question, they argue 
persuasively that for this patient a long period of anxiety 
and agitation (following the deaths of her children) brought 
about her first delusions and hallucinations which in turn 
produced a "feeling of strangeness" ("sentiment d 1etrangete.") 
The feeling of strangeness did not distort either percep­
tion or memory, however, and so well-known and well-remem­
bered people were recognized accurately but in association 
with a profound and pervasive feeling of strangeness. In 
order to make sense of this, the patient concluded that the 
people she saw were impostors. "The illusion of doubles, 
for her, is thus not, to speak correctly, a sensory illusion, 
but the conclusion of an affective judgment."(p.14) Cap­
gras and Reboul-Lachaux do not specifically explore the 
symptom of belief in doubles of the self except to say that 
too fits into the general delusion of persecution as the 
patient tried to explain why she was hospitalized and why 
she was unable to claim her ancestral inheritance. Of 
significance in their understanding of the formation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the delusion was the patient's "paranoid disposition. . . 
very marked inclination to distrust and minute investiga­
tion of the slightest details."(p.14)
The second case of the delusion reported in France is 
described in a short paper by Halberstadt (1923). "Doctors 
Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux have had the merit of recently 
calling attention to a new clinical syndrome to which they 
have given the name of illusion of doubles."(p.728) writes 
Halberstadt. His patient was a 41 year old woman, married, 
with a son of 20. At 24 she had a hysterectomy, afterward 
becoming "neurasthenic," melancholic, and eventually sui­
cidal. Several years later she had developed ideas of 
grandeur, bought things at random, and made large gifts of 
money. By her late 30s she was aloof, hostile, and irri­
table; she expressed paranoid delusions of people trying 
to poison her, spoke at times in neologisms, and suffered 
from auditory hallucinations, thought insertion, and thought 
broadcasting. She asserted there were doubles of her hus­
band, son, doctor, and nurses. Halberstadt does not 
speak at length about a belief in a double of the self, 
but notes that his patient believed that "All the world 
has a double, she like the others."(p.729) Halberstadt 
attributes the development of the delusion to "transitivism," 
a state in which the external world appears changed, and 
to regression to primitive, pre-logical modes of thought, 
in a patient with a paranoid suspiciousness. Halberstadt,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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however, notes that he offers his observations with reser­
vations, as a hypothesis rather than explanation. "It 
is,” he writes, "extremely difficult if not impossible to 
'explain' the genesis of all delusions. The mentality of 
the aliene is not in all ways similar to that of the normal 
man, his manner of creating and coordinating concepts is 
not ours, contradictions and implausabilities do not shock 
him." (p. 732)
Capgras reported his second case of the delusion of 
doubles in 1924 (Capgras and Carette, 1924). The patient 
was a woman of 33 who had been psychotic for eight to ten 
years at least. This woman had always loved her father 
more than her mother; she idealized him and was attentive 
to his physical and emotional state. She willingly broke 
off her only emotional attachment to a young man because 
her father disapproved. She hated her mother, however, 
for the mother was critical, pointing out her homeliness 
and masculine traits. The patient was from adolescence 
on obsessed about her appearance and its effects on others; 
at 18 she became withdrawn, seeking solitude in which she 
ruminated about the hateful mother who had caused her such 
pain; eventually she became irritable and antisocial and 
her agitation and threats necessitated hospitalization.
For six years her thoughts concentrated on "tenderness 
toward the father, hatred toward the mother."(p.60) Her 
feelings toward her father
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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constituted the principal concern of the patient, 
which she analyzed without cease and of which she spoke 
the most abundantly. She acknowledged with the most 
naive shamelessness her love for her father. In 
periods of calm this love appeared almost filial. It 
expressed itself most often in a melange of sentimen­
tal tenderness, of eroticism and of jealousy, ordina­
rily placid enough and without a truly passionate charac­
ter. But if, upon the influence of a commonplace anno­
yance, there occurred a crisis of excitation, immediate­
ly the sensuality awakened and Blanche overpowered 
with obscene insults the father who did not respond 
to her desires and the mother who was her rival, (p.60)
"The exteriorization of the Oedipus complex was entire­
ly spontaneous," write Capgras and Carette, "without the 
least intervention of psychoanalysis."(p.61) The general 
"psychic enfeeblement" (what we might call weakening of 
the ego?) of the psychotic illness led, they believe, to 
the eruption of Oedipal impulses into consciousness.
Nevertheless the psychic deficit and the correlative 
diminution of the moral sense did Dot entirely abolish 
the Censorship. This latter, henceforth incapable of 
repelling the Oedipus complex, concealed it under the 
influence of modesty and unconscious shame which sub­
sisted in spite of the shamelessness of the utterances, 
with the aid of a new conception, the illusion of 
doubles, which is, in effect, contemporaneous with 
the erotic acknowledgement. At the same time that she 
declared her incestous desires to her father, Blanche 
took him for a stranger of the same appearance: she 
built then a small delirium from which it followed 
that her parents had sold their clothing and furniture 
to the doubles with whom she lived and who came later 
to see her in the asylum. It was thus not to her true 
father but to a double of him that she had made her 
voluptuous demonstrations, (p.61)
The invention of the double was a final effort of "the 
Censorship," which could no longer repress the Oedipal im­
pulses entering consciousness, but could make them accept­
able by displacing them from the father to a stranger, a
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double who "looked like” her father. The patient, "far 
from seeking to veil her desire, was irritated at not being 
able to satisfy it." (p.62) She sought to have the "double" 
divorce the other woman and marry her. In distinction 
from the first reported case, write Capgras and Carette, 
the delusion of doubles in this second patient was preci­
pitated not by a feeling of strangeness, but by "a sudden 
insight provoked by unconscious shame."(p.62) The patient 
asserted that the truth of her beliefs had been confirmed 
by invisible voices and that invisible spirits had put 
the appearance of her parents on the strangers who came 
to see her.
The fourth case of the delusion of doubles appears in 
a brief report by Dupouy and Montassut (1924). Their pa­
tient, also a woman (age not given), suffered from a psycho­
tic illness of at least six years’ duration, marked by 
auditory hallucinations (commenting, accusing, insulting, 
and menacing) and by the delusion of doubles. She believed 
that all her friends had been replaced by doubles and that 
a "woman of bad life" had taken her place as well.
'How else explain all the filth I hear? I do nothing 
bad, conduct myself without scandal. Why do they ac­
cuse me of having made revels with soldiers, why do 
they dirty me? I think that all of that happens to 
a double I have at home, who dresses herself in my 
clothes and who passes for me.'(p.343)
Dupouy and Montassut see the delusion, in their case, as
a defensive process compensating for the difficulties of
the psychotic illness; it permits the patient to make sense
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of her hallucinations and of the changes in her friends' 
responses to her.
Capgras reported his third case in 1925. (Capgras, 
Lucchini, and Schiff, 1925) This patient was a woman of 
30 suffering from general paresis. She reported disagree­
able body sensations, auditory hallucinations, and a feel­
ing of strangeness: "Everything appeared changed to her.
She herself was totally changed."(p.210) In addition she 
suffered hypnogogic phenomena: she visualized herself en­
gaging in obscene acts with little men. And finally, she 
believed that her lover had been replaced by a double; she 
later asserted that members of her family had also been 
doubled. Capgras, Lucchini, and Schiff assert that the 
feeling of strangeness originated in this woman as she be­
gan to notice the emaciation caused by her syphilis, that 
the feeling of strangeness did not bring about a state of 
depersonalization, but rather elicited the delusion of 
doubles in an effort to combat the danger of depersonali­
zation: "The illusion of doubles appears to us here as an 
extreme attempt made by the mind of the patient to struggle 
against the grave menace of depersonalization constituted 
in the feeling of strangeness."(p.214) Trying to make 
sense of the indefinable feeling of strangeness which 
attacked her, a sensation based in an awareness of an in­
sidious physiological process (see Hollos and Ferenczi, 
1925), this woman reacted by creating the double and thus 
explaining the vague changes she was experiencing.
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The world (beings and landscapes) had changed around 
her. She herself had changed, and had to struggle to 
preserve the sense of herself. Her critical intelli­
gence remained nonetheless strong enough to note the 
characteristic differences, and she built her illusion 
of the double as the only rational explanation of the 
change, (p.214)
For this patient the belief in doubles was an intellectual
conclusion, made after acute observation of changed details,
which adequately explained changed conditions. Her lover,
for example, had in reality left her, then returned to
live with her. The patient said, "The true Marcel did not
desire me and the new /MarceI-7 wants to resume relations
with me, so he is no longer the same, he has been changed."
(p. 214)
Capgras, Lucchini, and Schiff make two observations 
in this report which are of theoretical importance. First, 
comparing this patient to Capgras' two previous reports 
and to that of Halberstadt mentioned above, they note that 
the process leading to the delusions seems to differ from 
case to case; no single pattern emerges. They note, how­
ever, that at first the doubles are always of people to 
whom the patient has strong affective ties. The affective 
factor is important:
Transformed into doubles were only those people to 
whom the patient was tied with intense affective 
sentiment such as, for example, her lover and an 
aunt who was very dear to her. (p.215)
(in all these early cases the first claims about doubles
referred to intimates: children, parents, lover. Where
the illness was of long duration, as in Capgras' first
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patient, the delusion seems to have generalized, including 
police and doctors, for example.) The second observation 
of importance comes in the effort of Capgras, Lucchini, 
and Schiff to relate the delusion of doubles to "normal” 
psychological phenomena. Recognition of others is a com­
plex process, and we all experience ephemeral false recog­
nitions and misrecognitions. "Who among us," they ask,
"has not happened to encounter a friend having changed in 
some commonplace way the habitual aspect of his appearance 
and said to ourself: ’this is not he, as I know him, but 
someone who resembles him greatly. . .’?"(p.214)
I will not speak at length of other early French pa­
pers. (I have located references to approximately 50 cases 
reported in French journals from 1923 to 1936 and have 
read about half of those cases.) Of minor historical in­
terest is the fact that the delusion of doubles was first 
called "Capgras’ Syndrome" by Dupouy and Montassut in their 
1924 paper (the fourth reported case) although Jacques Vie 
(1930) and Todd, Dewhurst, and Wallis (1981) assert that 
the honor was awarded by Levy-Valensi in his paper of 1929. 
Also of interest is the fact that all of the 25 to 30 
patients reported from 1923 to 1936 seem to have been wo­
men; the first man with the delusion is reported by Bro- 
chado in 1936.
Two French surveys do call for mention. Vie (1930) 
reviewed the cases of ten patients suffering from errors 
of recognition. He distinguished defects of memory from
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delusional errors and within delusional errors he distin­
guished positive doubles, in which non-existent similari­
ties are asserted, from negative doubles, in which non­
existent differences are asserted. An example of the as­
sertion of positive doubles comes from a case in which a 
woman habitually engaged in sexual activities with many 
men and asserted, "They look different, but are my husband." 
(p.236) Vie writes that delusions of positive doubles re­
present a more "advanced degree of mental dissociation" 
than that which is found in Capgras’ Syndrome, which is for 
Vie a delusion of negative doubles found in hallucinatory 
psychosis, paranoid dementia, confusional states, depres­
sion, general paresis, manic states, and so on. "The prog­
nosis is, then, as variable as those of the states in 
which it finds itself inserted. . ."(p.231) Since the 
patients never see the double and the original at the same 
time, the syndrome is not an illusion, but an "hypothesis 
capable of explaining the changed attitudes of those close 
to /the patient/."(p.232) The delusion begins as a plau­
sible explanation; that explanation, once adopted, becomes 
the central theme of the delusion. He concludes:
The syndrome of doubles, whether it presents itself 
in a positive or negative form, does not carry in 
itself any special prognostic indication. Its gravity 
is that of the state which serves as its base. How­
ever, one can consider it as the interpretation of 
a profound blow to the conscious personality; it rests 
in general on substantial troubles in the feeling of 
self, primordial base of affectivity; the feeling of 
strangeness, of physical and moral change seeming so 
paradoxical to the patient that he is unable to restrain
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himself from referring it onto the environment or 
from attributing it to some unwonted action of the 
environment upon himself, (p.236)
A year after Vie wrote his paper, Larrive and Jasien- 
ski (1931) also published a review of the syndrome. They 
follow Vie in distinguishing Capgras' Syndrome, a delusion 
of negative doubles, from delusions of positive doubles 
in which there are affirmations of imaginary resemblances. 
Capgras' Syndrome, they argue, is "characterized by the 
refusal to admit, in the presence of known people, their 
true identity,"(p.502) and to explain changes in relation­
ships by the imposition of doubles. In addition, only 
patients with Capgras' Syndrome use the characteristic 
word "double" (sosie).
The syndrome signifies a psychological reaction to­
wards the affective modifications which accompany 
the psychosis, a correction brought by the patient 
to the bizarre sensations and to the feelings of 
strangeness which invade him. (p.503)
Summarizing the divergent psychological explanations offered
by previous authors for the onset of the syndrome, Larrive
and Jasienski conclude that there is no single, simple
psychological explanation.
In fact, the illusion of doubles appears secondarily, 
in the course of a psychosis. It is a defensive re­
action which is opposed to diverse troubles which 
threaten one or another element of mental synthesis.
(p.503)
Larrive and Jasienski argue that the syndrome does not in­
volve perceptual or memory problems, but rather represents 
the least unreasonable explanation a psychotic patient can
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offer to make sense of his experiences. They note that 
the delusion seems to occur most often in the context of 
chronic paranoid delusions and that all reported cases have 
been of women. The new case they report is that of a para­
noid woman of 52 who claimed that there were doubles of 
(in order of assertion) her lover, her sisters, her brother- 
in-law, and her self. In their case, as in most others, 
there was no sign of intellectual impairment or of neuro­
logical problems; their patient, except for her paranoid 
illness, was in excellent health.
These early French descriptions leave us with the 
following impressions: Capgras’ Syndrome is best described
as a delusion in which the person believes in the existence 
of identical doubles of significant others and/or of him­
self. The delusion can occur in a variety of psychotic 
states (most often in paranoid schizophrenia) of both or­
ganic and functional origin and can be accompanied by a 
wide range of other symptoms. It is not an illusion, for 
no perceptual functions are impaired, nor an hallucinatory 
experience like autoscopy, and it is not a defect in memory. 
When the delusion is of doubles of others, the patient as­
serts that the real person has been replaced by an identi­
cal double, although slight changes in appearance or beha­
vior are alleged to give evidence of the imposture; when 
the delusion is of doubles of the self, the patient asserts 
that impostors in his image are at work in the world inter­
fering with his life by ruining his reputation or by
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claiming his wealth and property, etc. The prognosis 
for the syndrome is basically that of the psychotic ill­
ness. Explanations for the delusion vary with the parti­
cular history of each case, although it is clear that 
those who are doubled are always (at least initially, be­
fore the delusional system becomes all-encompassing) people 
to whom the patient is tied with strong affective bonds.
These early observations, acute and compassionate, are 
not significantly altered by more recent studies. The 
early reports present the basic phenomenological descrip­
tions and present the basic outlines of the main explana­
tory hypotheses that have been offered. Like later reports, 
however, they provide very little information about forma­
tive experiences in the early life of the patients who are 
described. More recent studies, to which I will now turn, 
present us with two major questions: first, the relation­
ship of Capgras' Syndrome to organic aetiology; and second, 
the need to develop an adequate psychodynamic hypothesis..
A number of authors have attributed the symptoms of 
Capgras’ Syndrome to organic causes. In the approximately 
20 to 25 papers arguing for organic causality, a wide 
variety of observations of organic conditions has been 
made. These include:
alcoholism (MacCallum, 1973);
basilar migraine (MacCallum, 1973);
brain tumor (Todd, Dewhurst, and Wallis, 1981);
cerebral atrophy (Gluckman, 1968; Nillson and Perris,1971);
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decreased platelet monoamine oxidase activity
(Sullivan et al.,1978);
diabetes (MacCallum,1973);
EEG abnormalities (Christodoulou,1977,1978a,1978b;
Malliaria and Christodoulou,1977; Kiriakos and 
Ananth, 1980) ;
head trauma (Fialkov and Robins, 1978; Weston and 
Whitlock, 1971);
low folic acid (MacCallum, 1973);
malnutrition (MacCallum, 1973);
myxedema (Madakasira and Hall, 1981);
organic brain syndrome (Goldfarb, 1974; Goldfarb and 
Wiener, 1977; Todd, Dewhurst, and Wallis,1981);
post varicella encephalitis (Nikolovski and Fernandez,
1978);
prosopagnosia (Granacher, 1978; Hayman and Abrams, 1977; 
Schraberg and Weitzel, 1979);
pseudohypoparathyroidism (Hay, Jolley, and Jones, 1974; 
Preskorn and Reveley, 1978);
right cerebral hemisphere dysfunction (Hayman and 
Abrams, 1977; Nillson and Perris, 1971);
temporal lobe epilepsy (Chawla and Virmani, 1977);
toxicity (MacCallum, 1973; Waziri, 1978).
The very variety of organic factors listed would tend to 
suggest that no one of these conditions could be the direct 
cause of the delusion of doubles. Some authors, however, 
make strong assertions of the necessity of organic condi­
tions in producing the delusion. Waziri (1978), for example, 
in discussing one case in which neuroleptic toxicity seemed 
to precipitate the delusion, dismisses psychodynamic theory:
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"In explaining these symptoms one could invoke one of 
several facile psychodynamic explanations."(p.257). Be­
cause his patient demonstrated signs of organicity which 
"would tend to make psychodynamic explanations inadequate 
if not spurious,"(p.357) Waziri emphasizes brain dysfunction:
Capgras' symptoms appear in individuals who have a 
brain dysfunction (probably involving the parietal 
lobes) as well as a psychosis. Neither_the brain 
dysfunction nor the psychosis are /sic/sufficient 
basis for the Capgras' symptoms, but the simultane­
ous presence of both is necessary to produce these 
symptoms, (p.358)
Waziri's patient, a 30 year old woman with a 22 year psychi­
atric history, left his care with a diagnosis of chronic 
undifferentiated schizophrenia. While he thoroughly docu­
ments early physical problems, he says little of her early 
interpersonal experiences. He does mention that at eight 
she sought care for a number of problems and received a 
diagnosis of conversion reaction; that she was hospitalized 
for six months in her early 20s, displayed paranoid tenden­
cies, sustained a marriage for only three months, and came 
into his care suffering hallucinations and delusions as 
well as Capgras' Syndrome. (Waziri has not read Capgras' 
paper: he refers to it, with inaccurate data, as cited in 
asoirfcer work.) Even if the delusion of doubles was triggered 
by neuroleptic toxicity— her Capgras' symptom disappeared 
when Mellaril was discontinued— this woman clearly had 
major problems in living as well. Waziri concludes that 
authors who have reported Capgras' Syndrome as a functional
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phenomenon have simply not discovered the organic com­
ponents in their patients.
It is, of course, appropriate to be alert for organic 
conditions in psychotic patients, but among authors who 
discuss organic factors as contributing to Capgras’ 
Syndrome there is much contradiction. In distinction, 
for example, to Waziri's (1978) observation that the 
delusion of doubles disappeared along with the toxic 
psychosis, we must consider Christoudoulou's (1978) 
conclusion, based on studies of 11 Capgras patients, 
and in agreement with Enoch, Trethowan, and Barker (1967), 
that "the progress of Capgras’ syndrome does not neces­
sarily follow the course of the associated psychosis."
(p.70) Christodoulou (1977) in turn,observes that "an 
organic cerebral dysfunction probably contributes to 
the pathogenesis of the syndrome," (p.562) and cites 
substantial differences in Verbal over Performance scores 
on the WAIS as giving evidence (along with a variety of 
EEG abnormalities) of cerebral dysfunction. Shraberg and 
Weitzel (1979), referring specifically to Christodoulou 
(1977), report no significant differences between Verbal 
and Performance scores in their two cases.
Shraberg and Weitzel (1979) postulate that Capgras’ 
Syndrome is
a peculiar but particular neuropsychiatric disorder 
involving the behavioral expression of an acquired 
integrative defecit (i.e., a disorder of facial 
recognition) in the presence of a psychopathological
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condition (schizophrenia, paranoid states, or even
depression), (p.315)
This disorder of facial recognition is prosopagnosia, a 
disorder which Hayman and Abrams (1977) also postulate 
lies at the basis of Capgras' Syndrome. The contention 
that prosopagnosia is the root of the delusion of doubles 
must be challenged, however, on the basis of literature 
discussion that entity itself. "Prosopagnosia," writes 
Meadows, (1974), "is the specific inability to recognize 
familiar faces." (p.489) Cohn, Newmann, and Wood (1977) 
concur, saying prosopagnosia is a "failure to recognize 
previously well known faces." (p.178) A male patient 
with prosopagnosia, for example, will not be able to 
recognize his wife in a "line-up" with three or four 
other women, but will immediately recognize her voice—  
and show no delusional thinking or paranoid distrust.
This is clearly different from Capgras patients who 
suffer no failure of recognition, but rather attribute 
delusional difference of identity to the instantly 
recognized facial image.
Most authors who observe organic conditions in 
patients with Capgras’ Syndrome recognize as well the 
power of psychopathology. Gluckman (1968) for example, 
documents cerebral atrophy but recognizes psychodynamic 
significance in the partucular psychology of his 
patient. Nikolovsky and Fernandez (1978) observed a 
pathological solution to the problem of ambivalence in
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their post-varicella encephalitis patient. The patients
of Shraberg and Weitzel (1979) presented in addition to
organic factors diagnoses of schizophrenia and paranoid
personality. Christodoulou (1977) comments about his
eleven Capgras patients:
It is probably worth noting that, irrespective of 
diagnosis, the clinical picture of almost all 
patients was dominated by a marked paranoid com­
ponent. (p.561)
Organic explanations which ignore dynamic contri­
butions are inadequate. Chawla and Virmani (1977) for 
example, describe a patient whose Capgras’ Syndrome 
they attribute to temporal lobe epilepsy. Their patient 
accused his father and one brother of being doubles.
He did not include his mother or six other siblings in 
the delusion. But temporal lobe epilepsy should not be 
able to discriminate among individuals if its effect is 
to create misre.cognition. This, perhaps, is the strong­
est point to be made regarding the necessity of a psycho­
dynamic component to the formation of the delusion of 
doubles: the allegation of doubling is always selective,
it is not general. Particular people are believed to 
have been replaced by doubles while others are accepted 
as being who they are. There is not a problem of "mis- 
recognition," as some authors would have it, nor is there 
a perceptual problem, but rather there is a problem of 
belief, a delusion. While organic conditions may well
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play a part in the origination or continuation of a 
psychotic state, the particular content of psychotic 
delusions contains psychological meanings, meanings to 
be sought not in lesions, but in the psychodynamics 
of the individuals involved. In addition to their 
individual psychology, some commonality must link those 
patients who develop the Capgras’ Syndrome. There 
must be some similar psychodynamic preconditions which 
can, in certain situations, lead toward the delusion 
of doubles.
Efforts to formulate psychodynamic explanations 
for Capgras" Syndrome have clustered around four basic 
themes emphasizing: 1) Oedipal problems in women (and
in "latent homosexual" men), 2) feelings of strangeness 
and other affective problems, 3) problems with ambival­
ence, and 4) pathological splitting. Little has been 
added to the descriptive, phenomenological accounts by 
Capgras and his associates; indeed, many of the efforts 
to explain the syndrome 'icaTk back to CapgrasT own 
efforts to find psychological meaning in the delusions 
of his three patients. I will now examine each of these 
four basic psychodynamic themes as they appear in the 
English language reports I have been able to obtain.
(See Appendix for a list of those cases.)
In what appears to be the first discussion of Capgras’ 
Syndrome published in English, Coleman (1933) reviews the 
French reports, then presents the case of a woman of 50
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who asserted that letters from her daughters were not 
genuine, but facsimilies written by someone else. This 
patient seems not to have claimed that her daughters 
themselves had been replaced by impostors, nor that 
there were doubles of herself, but Coleman suggests 
that the psychological mechanism is like that of the 
previous French reports. He adopts the notion in Capgras’ 
initial report (Capgras and Reboul-Lachaux, 1923) that 
the origin of the syndrome rests somehow in feelings of 
strangeness; he elaborates on that notion by speaking 
of disorders in "coenaesthesia," the normally unconscious 
feeling of the ongoing life-functioning of the organism, 
which accompanies all processes of perception and of 
which a person becomes aware only when perceptual 
sensations begin, for some reason, to seem strange.
Colemen then notes that all case reports have been of 
woman patients. (I have read, or found citations to, 
a total of 21 reported cases in the French literature 
from 1923 to 1933; all were of women.) Coleman con­
cludes: ’’Presumptive evidence would suggest that no
male cases have been described because the syndrome does 
not occur in men and that the mechanism is peculiar to 
women.”(p.49) To explain this sex bias he observes that
Men are on the whole more objective, and tend to take 
the outer world very much for granted. Women, on the 
contrary., are more subjective, and their whole atti­
tude towards the environment is colored by a mistrust 
of the reality and absolute significance of the object,
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findings by a subjective evaluation, (p.49)
He supports this supposition by referring to Freud's 1931
paper, "Female Sexuality.” For women, but not for men,
argues Coleman, the resolution of the Oedipal complex
requires the transfer of libidinal aims from mother to
father, with concomitant growth in hostile feelings
toward the mother, Coleman concludes that
Whatever the reason, the significant fact is that at 
a certain state in the little girl's life it is forced 
in upon her consciousness that she has been deceived 
in her object love; she finds herself hating where 
she had formerly only adored. Such a dramatic up­
heaval, requiring a complete reversal of former 
evaluations, would colour all subsequent reactions, 
and account for much that is distinctive in female 
psychology. "Things are not what they seem”— "I have 
loved where I should have hated"; such are the impres­
sions induced by this experience. From then onwards 
her attitude is characterized, not by ambivalence, 
but by a mistrust of the object; it may not be what 
it appears. And if at any time psychic disintegration 
occurs, it will be the object and not the self that 
will be found to be at fault....The female from 
infancy onward has had her faith in her object-love 
shattered. The mother being proved false in the 
beginning, all subsequent love-objects carry the 
same pattern. People are not what they seem; decep­
tion has occurred before and may occur again. The 
psychotic woman, rather than doubt the genuineness of 
her own feelings, decomposes the object and postulates 
the existence of doubles. (p.50-51)
In a second paper Colemen (1934) reviews doubles in liter­
ature and notes that almost all stories or novels on this 
theme are about doubles of the self of a male character; 
only one novel, Dostoevsky’s The Possessed, contains a 
scene in which a character, a woman, claims that doubles 
of others (in this case a husband) exist. Colemen writes,
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So far, then, it has been established that in an 
unbalanced mental state, subjective decomposition 
is liable to occur in men with the postulation of 
a double self. In women, on the contrary, under 
psychic stress decomposition of the object is the 
more likely mechanism, the resulting syndrome 
being the "Illusion of Doubles." (p.271)
The proposition that Capgras’ Syndrome afflicted
women only was challenged in 1936 in a report by Murray.
Murray (1936) describes a male patient of 32 who after
several years of hospitalization for schizophrenia
asserted that his parents were doubles. As a child
this man had been shy and solitary. "The father regards
his son with soft sentimental feelings, and has always
been inclinced to ’mother’ him." (p.63) As a young man
he was reserved, obsessional, and hypochondriacal. He
gave up work and hobbies, began to hallucinate, and
developed paranoid delusions. Murray accepts Coleman's
notions of Oedipal development and (fitting case into
theory, perhaps) concludes that this case of Capgras'
Syndrome in a male can be explained by the presence of
"latent homosexuality."
Reviewing the history of the case described here 
there are certain features which strongly suggest 
a latent homosexuality. The patient is physically 
well developed, but of exaggerated complexion, the 
"milk and roses" type. His known difficulty in 
attaining adequate heterosexual adjustments and the 
revealing nature of the hallucinatory content,
"Nancy boy," show that there is a difficulty of this 
order present.
If we consider that the course of development of 
infantile sexuality in homosexual males follows the 
lines of that already described in the female, we 
can see an explanation of the occurence of Capgras' 
Syndrome in the case described, (p.66)
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(It should be noted that in the same year as Murray -wrote, 
Brochado /1936/ also presented the case of Capgras' Syn­
drome in a male patient, but without any special comment.) 
The Oedipal hypothesis disappears from the literature by 
the early 1940s as Davidson (1941) reported Capgras' Syn­
drome in two men where homosexuality was not an issue. 
Subsequently, many cases have been reported in men; of 
the 124 cases I have listed in the Appendix, 70 are of 
women, 51 are men (3 reports do not specify sex). If the 
problem were Oedipal, it would be seen much more often 
in psychotic women; if it were restricted to women, we'd 
not see it in men. As an explanatory hypothesis, then, 
it is grossly unsatisfactory.
Davidson's patients, both men at Manhattan State Hos­
pital, claimed that their wives were doubles. He writes 
that the alleged "differences" between the "double” and 
the "real wife” which were mentioned by these men were in­
ventions in support of the delusion, not perceptual prob­
lems. His efforts at explanation present a melange of 
positions: he notes that the dynamics of reported cases 
are quite different, but then tries to find common quali­
ties through a combination of the ideas of "feelings of 
strangeness," a "double attitude toward the present and 
toward past experiences," "depersonalization and dereali­
zation," "coenesthesia^" "projecting and identifying 
mechanism,""and regression to a magic form of thinking."
(pp. 519,520,521)
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Other authors present more economical explanations 
predicated on the importance of the feeling of strangeness 
and related affective states. The basic notion here is that 
the patient becomes aware of changes in his customary af­
fective responses to significant people in his life. These 
changes in affective response can be triggered by actual 
alterations in interpersonal life. Haslam (1973), for ex­
ample, presents a case of Capgras' Syndrome in a schizo­
phrenic woman who developed the delusion that her fiance 
had been replaced by a double— at the time he, in actuality, 
had developed a schizophrenic illness. Unable to accept 
the changes in him, suggests Haslam, she declared him to 
be an impostor. Siomopoulos and Goldsmith (1975) report 
a case like that of Capgras' third patient (Capgras, Luc­
chini, and Schiff, 1925), in which a paranoid schizophrenic 
man, frustrated in his ambitions as well as by his illness, 
developed Capgras' Syndrome. They write:
We assume that the patient with the typical Capgras' 
Syndrome, after experiencing unacceptable changes in 
himself and his conditions of living, projects them 
onto persons closely related to him (probably the ones 
he considers responsible for these changes) to the 
effect that the initial 'I have changed, I am not the 
person I used to be' becomes 'He has changed, he is 
not the person he used to be,' and subsequently, through 
the processes of denial and rationalization, 'He is 
not the real one, he is an impostor.' (p.756)
(Other authors as well discuss the feeling of strangeness,
for example: Bankier, 1966; Merrin and Silberfarb, 1976;
Mikkelson and Gutheil, 1976.) Whatever the origin of the
shift in feelings, it is misunderstood, transformed, and
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the result is the assertion of the existence of doubles. 
"Things are different with me and him," the patient may 
think, "I've never felt this way with him, so it can't be 
him, he is an impostor who looks identical: a double."
The notion that feelings of strangeness, especially in 
close relationships, may lie at the heart of Capgras' Syn­
drome reminds us of the importance of the actual experi­
ences and relationships of those who develop the delusion, 
but we are left with the question of why such emotional 
changes, which occur frequently, should produce the speci­
ficity of the rare delusion of doubles rather than a vari­
ety of other responses. Hypotheses stressing the problem 
of ambivalence attempt to deal with that question.
Tood (1957) presents a discussion of seven cases of 
Capgras’ Syndrome, five in women, two in men, and his dis­
cussion offers a number of provocative observations. Cit­
ing anthropological evidence, primarily from Crawley (1914), 
he notes that ideas of doubles are common in primitive cul­
tures where often the soul is believed to be an exact re­
plica of the person. Some cultures believe that shadows, 
reflections, and dream images are the visible forms of 
the soul. Todd also notes the Greek story of Amphitryon, 
and he observes that dualism, or the belief in polar op­
posites, is a basic motif of primitive philosophy. He 
concludes that "the disintegration of the personality 
doubtless sets free primitive modes of thought, which in­
clude the tendency to think in terms of doubles and
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dualism." (p.263) Todd asserts that in Capgras' Syndrome 
the patient splitsthe object of his delusion into debased 
and sanctified images and thus "offers an effective solu­
tion to the problem of ambivalent emotions, a Jeky11- 
prototype being differentiated from a Hyde-double, or more 
rarely, vice versa."(p.264) Noting that the person "doubled" 
is always linked to the patient by intimate emotional bonds, 
Todd sees the syndrome being determined by an interaction 
of factors: first, the psychotic regression to primitive 
thinking and belief in dualism; second, a paranoid state; 
third, the presence of marked ambivalence.
The notion that Capgras' Syndrome represents a psycho­
tic solution to the problem of ambivalence has been accept­
ed by a variety of authors: Arieti and Meth (1959), Dally 
and Gomez (1979), Enoch, Trethowan, and Barker (1967), 
Meissner (1977), Moskowitz (1972), Nikolevski and Fernan­
dez (1978), and Vogel (1974), for example. In his presen­
tation of five cases of Capgras' Syndrome, Vogel (1974) de­
scribes the process as follows:
Repression finally fails and is no longer successful 
in binding the patient to her strongly ambivalent 
feelings in regard to her love object. She begins to 
feel that she hates as well as loves this emotionally 
important individual. This realization is the fons et 
origo of the special and qualitatively unusual features 
found in the syndrome.(p.923). . . The love object is 
split into a good and bad individual who, of course, 
outwardly resemble one another almost exactly.(p.924)
. . .The Capgras Syndrome rather elegantly shows the 
major use of the defense mechanisms of ambivalence, 
concretization of mental representations, splitting 
of the object, displacement, projection, and identifi­
cation— or rather, misidentification. In very visible
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fashion, under the threat of disintegrating forces, 
the ego makes a desperate psychotic effort to main­
tain some relationship with its love object, (p.924)
In the first edition of the American Handbook of Psychiatry 
(1959), Arieti and Meth suggest that the double is always 
an important person, that the patient in some way rejects 
that person, but that the patient cannot allow himself to 
be conscious of that rejection because of guilt or ambi­
valence, and so displaces his rejecting feelings onto the 
"double" in "an unusual form of psychotic displacement"
(p.549) that has "not yet been fully explained."(p.550) 
Enoch, Trethowan, and Barker (1967), modifying Enoch's 
(1963) earlier emphasis on affect change, conclude, "Two 
fundamental opposing views of the same person are present, 
and this ambivalence is the basis of the psychopathology 
of the condition."(p.8) They suggest that the invention 
of the "double" allows the patient to express his hostility 
without risking the guilt that would ensue from such ex­
pressions directed at a loved person. Meissner (1977) 
concurs, stating, "The origins of this doubling of the ob­
ject seem to lie in the patient's intolerable ambivalence 
toward the significant love object."(p.424) And Nikolevski 
and Fernandez (1978) conclude their report by stating:
The delusion of doubles in its psychodynamic aspects 
is the psychotic solution to the problem of ambivalence; 
it is an unusual defense reaction, a desperate and 
ultimate attempt at coping with an intolerable intra­
psychic conflict, (p.41)
The suggestion that Capgras' Syndrome is a psychotic 
solution to the problem of ambivalence, however, leaves us
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intolerable in these patients and why their response is 
to split the object into "real" and "impostor" rather 
than to institute some other psychological "solution."
The key may lie in the word "split," for if the signifi­
cant people in the patients' lives have in some sense 
never been accepted in normally integrated ambivalence, 
then perhaps ambivalence when felt becomes intolerant.
It is to the concept of splitting, then, that we must next 
turn.
The concept of splitting has recently been put for­
ward as an explanatory hypothesis capable of illuminating 
the Capgras' Syndrome. (Arieti and Bemporad, 1974; Cavenar, 
Maltbie, and Petty, 1977; Dally and Gomez, 1979; Lehmann, 
1980; Mikkelsen and Gutheil, 1976; Moskowitz, 1972,1973.)
In the second edition of the American Handbook of Psychi­
atry Arieti and Bemporad (1974) write, "This syndrome seems 
to represent in a dramatic fashion what Melanie Klein 
proposed as the early infantile solution to ambivalence, 
the 'splitting' of the parent into good and bad imagos."
(p.714). Lehmann (1980) in The Comprehensive Textbook of 
Psychiatry, III writes that in the Capgras’ Syndrome "The 
splitting of a person who constitutes an important libidi- 
nal object into his good and bad parts— a basic psycho- 
dynamic mechanism— is transduced into perceptual reality 
by the patient."(p.1993) The notion of splitting, which
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I will discuss in greater detail below, is of particular 
use in thinking about the delusion of doubles for two 
principal reasons: first, the concept of splitting allows 
for the theoretical linkage of the affect state and ambi­
valence hypotheses (see, for example, Dally and Gomez,
1979); and second, the concept of splitting can be anchored 
in developmental stages (Lehmann, 1980; Mikkelsen and 
Gutheil, 1976; Moskowitz, 1972), thus allowing for under­
standing of both normal and pathological phenomena.
Moskowitz (1972), who has reported the only success­
ful psychotherapeutic treatment of Capgras’ Syndrome (all 
other successes are attributed to chemical or convulsive 
treatments), notes:
Capgras1 Syndrome, then, is a complicated situation 
in which "delusional” belief, usually paranoid, is 
linked to an affective response— a feeling of strange­
ness—  which results in the conviction that a familiar 
person is a look-alike impostor.(p.59) The splitting 
of an ambivalently held object into good and bad 
(impostor) parts is represented in the distortion of 
perceptual reality. It is a mechanism whereby the 
undesirable parts of the particular object may be 
rejected without incurring as much guilt as in re­
jecting the total object, (p.61)
The internalized object is split— I shall suggest how
below— into a "good," consciously acknowledged, image and
a "bad," repressed and unconscious image. Those images
persist until a change in the interpersonal relationship
triggers a significant affective shift. Two responses
ensue: first, the patient concludes that "He/she wouldn't
make me feel that way— he/she is different, a double;"
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and second, the patient experiences feelings that cannot 
be addressed to the consciously held object but that force 
their way into awareness— "I hate him/her, but I wouldn't 
feel that way to the ’real' him/her because he/she is so 
good." (The patient may additionally conclude that expressed 
hostile feelings might provoke massive retaliation.) The 
dilemma is resolved by declaring that a double, an appro­
priate target for negative feelings, has replaced the good 
real person. This pathological process, Moskowitz (1972) 
argues, has its roots in the normal developments of the 
separation-individuation stage. I should note here that 
the "double" in Capgras’ Syndrome is most often a nega­
tively regarded figure, but the concept of splitting would 
also allow for negatively regarded real objects and dis­
sociated positive feelings which, when they press into 
awareness, produce anxiety. (See, for example, Christodou- 
lou's /1978/ description of positively regarded doubles.)
An object relations approach was taken by Moskowitz 
(1972) in his treatment of a 12 year old boy who displayed 
Capgras1 Syndrome. Because Moskowitz reports the only 
detailed account of a psychotherapeutic treatment of the 
syndrome, including information about early interpersonal 
experiences of a patient, it is useful to summarize his 
experience. The boy whom Moskowitz treated became fright­
ened that his parents and younger brother had been replaced 
by doubles, whom he called "aliens? and whom he likened to
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the extra-terrestrial ’’invaders" of a then-popular tele­
vision show. "Small differences in the usual expected 
appearance or action of a family member would elicit an­
xiety, "(p.46) The immediate families of both parents in­
cluded relatives with severe mental illness; the mother ex­
pressed reservations about two such people marrying and 
having children and, in addition, endured three unsuccess­
ful pregnancies before the birth of this boy.
The boy was named after a schizophrenic uncle who 
died a suicide. He was raised according to rigid guide­
lines by his mother, the father deferring entirely to his 
wife. When he was 15 months old the mother spent eight 
days away from home to give birth to her second child.
The boy then developed gastro-intestinal problems which 
continued until he was four. He also showed other forms 
of regressive behavior, including delayed toilet training, 
sitting to urinate, and use of a pacifier. During the 
years before he came into Moskowitz's care he was a guarded 
and unspontaneous child. The boy seemed to feel a con­
flict related to "the rigid disciplining mother and the 
concerned protective mother."(p.52) He called both parents 
"fakes."
David's preoccupation with doubles, fakes, and 'aliens' 
continued intermittently throughout the entire period 
he was in treatment. It would become more apparent 
and troublesome when David felt angry or resentful 
toward people in his family or toward me. As I became 
familiar with the pattern I began reminding him of 
the affect just preceding his reaction. Initially
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he denied any connection. Later he agreed that 
he had negative feelings toward the person whose 
identity had seemed to change, (p.53)
The boy included Moskowitz in the delusion, but Moskowitz 
was able to use this to demonstrate even more clearly 
"that feeling states might produce psychic phenomena" and 
to increase the boy's insight.
The patient Moskowitz treated seems to have had the 
kind of early disruptions in object relations which could 
provoke split internalized object-representations: a mother 
whose "concerned protective" image could hardly be recon­
ciled with a "rigid disciplining" image; a mother who left 
him at 15 months with a father who had previously had al­
most nothing to do with his care. While Moskowitz does 
not offer his suggestions about what events might have 
precipitated the initial development of the delusion, he 
does indicate clearly that changes in feeling states seemed 
to trigger the intermittent belief that the parents had 
been replaced. (See also the three similar examples, one 
from Bettelheim ]_1976/, two from my own experience, in 
Chapter IV.) The success of the therapy seems to have lain 
in Moskowitz's ability to help the boy recognize how these 
contrasting affective states, triggered by some interper­
sonal interchange, elicited ideas of the protective, reas­
suring "reality" or the hostile, frightening "imposture" 
of the parental figures.
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To understand adequately the process of splitting 
and its applicability to the Capgras' Syndrome, one must 
enter the sometimes convoluted realms of "object relations 
theory," the psychoanalytic theory of how we internalize 
representations or images of significant others and of 
ourselves and how we integrate those internalized repre­
sentations and are affected by them. I have found that 
that the works most useful for my thinking about the de­
lusion of doubles are those of Otto Kernberg (1972,1975, 
1976). Kernberg argues that earliest experiences are 
internalized according to their affective valence: posi­
tive experience (instinctual gratification, satiation, 
loving mother-child interaction) has at the start a 
globally "good" affective character which is internalized 
along with initially undifferentiated self-representations 
and object-representations; while negative experience 
(frustration, rage, anxiety-laden or hostile mother-child 
interaction) is internalized around a "bad” affective 
tone and its associated self- and object-representations.
In very early infancy, then, a "good" internal object com­
posed of undifferentiated self- and object-representations 
is separately internalized, or split, from a "bad" internal 
object. It is because of the opposite affective states 
that these early internalized representations are kept a- 
part, at first simply because they occur separately and 
the infantile ego is as yet incapable of integrating them, 
and later because of anxiety. Each new experience brings
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with it an image of self and an image of object, with 
an affect state linking them. Gradually, as the ego be­
gins to distinguish self and not-self, the self-represen­
tations begin to fuse and a differentiation of self-image 
from object-image occurs in the core "good" self-object 
image.
To the norms! splitting of earliest infancy is added 
the defensive splitting which begins at about three or 
four months, peaks at six to twelve months, and then 
diminishes during the second year. Defensive splitting 
is utilized to keep apart the libidinally invested and 
aggressively invested self- and object-representations 
in order to protect the ideal, good relationship with the 
mother from "contamination" by the "bad" self-representa- 
tions and representations of her. In normal development, 
good and bad self-representations are integrated into a 
realistic self-concept, and good and bad object-represen­
tations are integrated into a total object-representation: 
the infant has learned that he and mother are separate and 
now recognizes that the "good" and "bad" mother are one 
and the same, sometimes interacting with him in satisfying 
and happy ways, sometimes bringing frustration and unhap­
piness. With self differentiated from object and with the 
integration of self-images and object-images, it is possible 
for ideal self-images to coalesce with ideal object-images 
into an "ideal self" as precursor to the superego. Repression 
replaces splitting as a defensive process, and the child
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grows toward healthy ego-identity.
Splitting, then, is a normal developmental process in 
earliest infancy, a normal and diminishing defensive pro­
cess in the first two years of life. Splitting is not only 
of affect states but of object-images and self-images as 
well, and because internalizations are crucial to the or­
ganization and integration of the ego, the process of 
splitting splits the ego as an organization. "This active 
separation by the ego of positive and negative introjec- 
tions, which implies a complete division of the ego, and, 
as a consequence, of external reality as well, is, in 
essence, the defensive mechanism of splitting."(Kernberg, 
1976, p.36) As has been mentioned, in normal development 
the defensive process of splitting diminishes in the 
second year of life and is eventually superceded by re­
pression, but in pathological situations splitting can be 
maintained; it becomes a "pathological dissociation of 
polar opposite ego states in order to prevent an all- 
pervasive anxiety and fear of destruction.” (Kernberg,
1972, p.239) If splitting becomes excessive, pathological, 
then the split-off, hostile "bad" representations are 
never allowed to fuse with their "good" counterparts, but 
rather
the most frightening units involving self and object 
images under the influence of primitive affect are re­
pressed and this interferes with their ultimate differ­
entiation and integration within the total personality. 
Primitive unrealistic self- and object-representations 
remain relatively unchanged in the id, and so do their 
correspondingly primitive, overwhelming affect disposi­
tions. (Kernberg, 1976, p.70)
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Initially split then repressed "bad” representations, 
originally internalized in primitive, infantile form, re­
main out of consciousness; while idealized "good" self- 
and object-representations are accessible to consciousness. 
But why should defensive splitting become pathological? 
"Environmental factors, particularly severe chronic frus­
trations in early childhood, appear as the predominant 
etiological factor." (Kernberg, 1972, p.242) Pathological 
disruption of personality development occurs, in Kernberg’s 
view, from distortions in the internalization of interper­
sonal relations. "Early maternal deprivation determines 
abnormal personality development through the intermediate 
variable represented by faulty internalized object rela­
tions." (Kernberg, 1972, p. 233)
I would suggest (along with Moskowitz, 1972; Arieti 
and Bemporad, 1972; and Lehmann, 1980), that pathological 
defensive splitting of internalized object-representations 
is at the psychodynamic root of the Capgras’ Syndrome. In 
brief, the patient who develops the delusion of doubles 
has suffered early maternal deprivation of the sort that 
prohibits the normal fusion of "good" self-representations 
with "bad" self-representations and "good" object-represen­
tations with "bad” object-representations. Defensive 
splitting increases, rather than diminishing with maturity, 
and images of people who enter the life of the patient are 
continually fragmented into "good” and "bad" internalized
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representations. An idealized "all good" self-represen­
tation is accessible to consciousness, as is an "all good" 
object-representation, while the split "all bad" images 
are dissociated and unconscious. Later in life some event 
precipitates the awareness of previously unconscious images 
and associated feelings. The event may be a sudden affec­
tive shock caused by changes in an important interpersonal 
relationship (emotional disappointment, a rejection, or 
a genuine alteration in the other) at which point the pa­
tient is unable to integrate his newly conscious bad feel­
ing because his image of the other has excluded the possi­
bility of mixed or ambivalent responses. The negative 
affect, fear, and anxiety elicit the "bad" representations 
hitherto split and repressed, and the patient concludes 
that the person with whom he is dealing cannot be the 
person he has always known. So different are the images 
and feelings that the patient can conclude that the other 
person is therefore a double. A similar pattern could 
develop if the precipitating affective change were to 
occur within the patient himself, due to depersonalization, 
“feelings of strangeness," or the onset of a psychotic 
illness. The patient again feels unfamiliar and uneasy 
in the presence of a significant other and the rise to 
consciousness of previously unconscious bad representations 
stimulates the delusional elaboration. A variation might 
be that the patient senses that he is no longer the person
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he once was, rejeets that feeling because his all-good 
self image cannot integrate it, and concludes that it is 
the other who is causing him to feel different, that the 
other person has changed.
The concept of splitting, then, seems able to encompass 
feelings of strangeness, affective changes, and problems 
of ambivalence, and is thus the most useful construct with 
which to approach the delusion of doubles. It would seem 
that for the development of Capgras* Syndrome a convergence 
of three phenomena would be necessary, if we are to explain 
both the process of the delusional formation and the rela­
tive rarity of its occurrence. These phenomena are: first, 
strong paranoid characteristics, noted by Capgras and 
Reboul-Lachaux (1923) in the first report as well as by 
Christodoulou (1978) more recently; second, the presence 
of a psychotic state, induced by organic or functional 
conditions; and third, a history of disturbed early object 
relations leading toward unintegrated, internalized self- 
and object-representations and the pathological defense 
mechanism of splitting.
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III
The Case History
The family of Dr. F. (for she was, in addition to 
everything else, a fully qualified physician) had suffered 
dreadfully during the Holocaust. Her father, a rabbi and 
school teacher, and her mother, the principal of a religious 
school, were hidden by a Christian woman who had worked 
as their housekeeper in a town near the Polish-German bor­
der. They were childless at the time, having tried unsuc­
cessfully for many years to conceive a child. While in 
hiding, however, Mrs. F. became pregnant. By subterfuge she 
was able to enter a local hospital and there gave birth to 
a boy, but she was recognized by a non-Jewish former neigh­
bor and fled back to the housekeeper's basement with the 
just-born child. The F.’s protector, however, was herself 
childless, and the infant's crying if overheard posed a 
lethal threat of detection to all. The housekeeper took 
the boy to a convent to be cared for by nuns, but the nuns 
gave him up for adoption to a farmer. The good housekeeper 
continued to hide the F.'s and made weekly trips to the 
farm where their son was being raised, ostensibly to buy 
or beg food, actually to observe the boy's progress and 
report to the hidden parents.
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After Russian troops drove the Nazi forces back, Mr.
F. understandably but rashly ran to the farm where his son, 
now a toddler, was living. He claimed his son, but the 
irate farmer drove the distraught father away with threats 
of death. The next day Mr. F. contacted Russian troops 
and managed to convince them to go with him to the farm.
The farmer showed them a freshly dug grave and told them 
the boy was dead. No one was ever to know if the boy in­
deed had died or if he had been hidden elsewhere.
Several days later the farmer reported to a different 
group of Russians that Mr. F. had been a Nazi collarborator. 
Mr. F. was arrested and sent to a Russian labor camp near 
Minsk, sentenced to five years at hard labor. Such horror 
upon horror seems inconceivable, but as Krystal and Nieder- 
land (1968) point out, "Survivors of disasters and perse­
cutions are suspected of unfair play, collaboration with 
the enemy, or harlotry."(p. 343) In the labor camp fate 
played yet another trick: Mr. F. was noticed and interro­
gated by a Russian officer, also Jewish, who believed his 
story. The officer ordered Mr. F. to the camp infirmary for 
several weeks of rest, then called him back and told him 
that papers had been prepared indicating that he had "died" 
while in the camp— and he could return home and try to find 
his wife. Mr. F. was reunited with his wife, and they made 
their way to a displaced persons center in Vienna. There, 
in the spring of 1947, Mrs. F. gave birth to a second child, 
her daughter, Dr. F.
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I was unable to investigate thoroughly the Holocaust 
experiences of Dr. F.'s parents (her father had died in 
1971; her mother, a broken woman, lived in a nursing home), 
but I was able to obtain some information about their home 
life from Dr. F.'s uncle and from her cousin, also a physi­
cian about her age. We know too, from an extensive litera­
ture, the nature of the effects of the Holocaust on the 
survivors and on their children. It is to that literature 
that I now must turn.
Numerous authors (Eitinger, 1962; Krystal and Nieder- 
land, 1968; Ledere, 1965; Niederland, 1964b, 1968; Trossman, 
1968) have described the "survivor syndrome" which afflicts 
so many who endured internment, terror, torture, and humi­
liation during the Holocaust. The syndrome includes: 
chronic anxiety and depression; sleep disturbances, includ­
ing insomnia and nightmares; psychosomatic symptoms; chronic 
fatigue; disturbances of cognition, memory, and concentra­
tion; irritability, emotional lability or moodiness; ob­
sessive ruminations, moroseness and apprehensiveness; social 
isolation, withdrawal and inability to enjoy life; and 
survivor guilt. Few, if any, survivors seem to have es­
caped one or more of these symptoms. Several authors (Nie­
derland, 1964b; Eitinger, 1962) comment on the troubling 
memories that enter the consciousness of survivors in associ­
ation to harmless or even benign experiences. Eitinger 
(1962), for example, writes of such painful associations,
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They can occur in any connection whatsoever, from 
seeing a person stretching his arms and associating 
this with fellow prisoners hung up by their arms under 
torture, to seeing an avenue of trees and visualizing 
long rows of gallows with hanging corpses. Children 
playing peacefully may suddenly and without apparent 
cause call to mind other children, emaciated, tortured, 
murdered, (p. 372)
While most authors write primarily of survivors who were 
incarcerated in Nazi camps, it is important to bear in 
mind that the terror and torment were no less traumatic 
for those who survived in ghettos or in hiding. Ostwald 
and Bittner (1968), for example, in writing of their sub­
jects who survived in hiding, declare:
From the accounts available to us, we can say that 
the fugitive existence of those who escaped the 
Nazi dragnet and subsisted in forests and bunkers 
was as suffused with terror and martyrdom as was the 
life of concentration camp inmates, (p. 89)
Venzlaff (1964), writing of those who survived in hiding,
notes
a striking resemblance of the mental disorders in 
such persecuted persons, who were not in prisons 
and not in concentration camps, with those mental 
disorders which we could find in patients who very 
often spent many years in concentration camps, 
ghettos, or work camps, under severe and somatic 
strain, (p. 178)
If the survivor syndrome was present, even to a moder­
ate degree, in Dr. F.'s parents, we need to explore the 
effects on Dr. F., for as Lipkowitz (1973) writes, "It 
must be anticipated that the psychic scarring of the survi­
vors will have noxious effects upon the development of 
their children." (p.141) I have reviewed some of the li­
terature on children of Holocaust survivors (Borocas and
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Borocas, 1973, 1980; Epstein, 1977, 1980; Fogelman and
Savran, 1980; Freyberg, 1980; Klein, 1973; Krystal and
Niederland, 1968; Lipkowitz, 1973; Rakoff, Sigal, Epstein,
1967; Sigal and Rakoff, 1971; Sigal, Silver, Rakoff, and
Ellin, 1973; Trossman, 1968) and can summarize some of
the effects on parenting and child development attributed
to the massive psychic trauma experienced by the survivors.
Of most importance, perhaps, in terms of parent-child
relations are what Niederland (1968) has observed, after
clinical observations of some 800 survivors, as
Tendency to isolation, withdrawal, and brooding 
seclusion; tenuous and unstable object relations, 
with marked ambivalence notable in lasting dis­
turbances of object relations, (p.313)
Survivor parents are described as being over-protective 
and overly anxious about the health and well-being of their 
children. They are frightened that something terrible 
will happen to them, and are often beset by persecution 
dreams in which their children are victimized. Their wor­
ries engender anxiety and mistrustfulness in their children. 
(Borocas and Borocas, 1973; Freyberg, 1980; Krystal and 
Niederland, 1968; Trossman, 1968) The mothers are described 
as withdrawn, depressed, fearful, uncommunicative; they 
are bound to their past and often unable to respond ade­
quately to their growing children.
Because of their total preoccupation with tormenting 
memories and with an unending re-living of their trau­
matic past, the parents have few emotional resources 
left over to meet any but the most routine psychological 
pressures. The continually changing emotional needs and 
their children’s requests for attention and care are 
either ignored or dealt with as unfair demands. (Rakoff, 
Sigal and Epstein, 1967, p. 24)
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While the considerations mentioned above apply to 
a wide sampling of survivor parents, a special tragic edge 
is added to the pain of those who lost children during 
the Holocaust while managing to survive themselves. Speak­
ing of this issue, Ostwald and Bittner (1968) note, "Those 
who lost children as a result of the persecution were 
among the saddest and most guilt-ridden patients in our 
sample." (p.88) Niederland (1968) notes that chronic de­
pressive states correlate highly with the specific trauma 
of the loss of a child, and Krystal and Niederland (1968) 
observe that in their sample "Survivor guilt was specifi­
cally strongly correlated to the loss of children, both in 
2
incidence and severity (X =54.30; f=26, reliable at the
.001 level."(p.331) Often survivors who lost a child feel
that they have sacrificed that child to save their own
lives. (Klein,1973)
We know that, in general, women who have survived the
Holocaust have had difficulties as mothers. Krystal and
Niederland (1968) write of their sample:
Of the women in this series, only 2 per cent were 
considered completely successful in their function 
as wives and mothers, and 45 (49 per cent) of all 
women were grossly inadequate as housekeepers and 
mothers, (p.332)
Most of the authors studying parent-child interaction find 
difficulty occurring in pre-Oedipal stages of development. 
Klein (1973), commenting on the child's anal phase experi­
ments with autonomy and separation, notes that "The child's 
strivings create anxiety, aggression, and feelings of help­
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lessness in the mother," and adds that "the fearful atti­
tude of the parents is shared by the children and is mani­
fested in the difficulty of both separating from each other." 
(p.406) Freyberg (1980) argues that children of Holocaust 
survivors rarely achieve a complete traversing of the 
separation-individuation process described by Mahler (1972). 
Freyberg notes that the child striving toward autonomy 
needs its mother's love and support, but that survivor 
mothers fear and disapprove of those strivings and so en­
gender depression and axiety about the loss of the mother 
in their children.
It is at this crucial juncture of the individuation 
process that the mourning, grieving, affect-lame, 
guilty, and overwhelmed survivor mother has difficul­
ty gratifying her child's need for emotional respon­
siveness and availability, (p. 91)
In a world she feels is unsafe, the survivor mother re­
sponds negatively to the child's efforts at separation.
The child in turn responds to the mother's anxiety and be­
comes highly ambivalent about autonomy and separateness; 
the frightening anger engendered by the mother's inability 
to gratify must however be repressed; the child cannot in­
dividuate, for it is too much a loss for the parents, too 
great a risk for itself. Lipkowitz (1973) summarizes:
Burdened by guilt, tension, and fear, she /the mother/ 
cannot assist in another separation. In addition, from 
Erikson’s point of view the chronically depressed and 
withdrawn mother cannot inspire basic trust, without 
which the capacity to accept the reality that symbiosis 
with the mother cannot be maintained will not develop. . . 
Unable to tolerate separation, the concentration camp 
mother cues for symbiosis,with expected results, (p.152)
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Krystal and Niederland (1968) agree with Freyberg (1980)
and Lipkowitz (1973). They note in addition that survivors
have great difficulty expressing aggression as well as in
nurturing and responding to children, and they conclude:
The repression of aggression tends to produce prob­
lems of aggression in the next generation. The im­
pairment of the ability for nurturing of the children 
tends to produce depressions in the next generation.
Both problems tend to promote symbiotic relationships 
and interfere with the individuation of the youngster.
. . .the irreparable loss is that of faith and trust 
in one's fellow man and in the essential benign nature 
of the world. The disturbance here is so profound that 
the benign introjects become unavailable as patterns 
for mothering and nurturing behavior. . . .The survi­
vors form abnormal families and communities. The fa­
milies tend to be sado-masochistic and affect-lame.(p.346)
This devastating pattern of child-rearing and family life 
produces, of course, devastating effects upon the children.
In speaking of the children of survivors Ostwald and 
Bittner (1968) write, "Their environment looks tense, 
dreary, and emotionally impoverished."(p.93) Fogelman and 
Savran (1980) note that the children are over-protective 
toward the parents and have a guilt-ridden attitude toward 
their parents who have suffered so much; they feel a need 
to identify with their parents' suffering, yet feel they 
cannot talk about Holocaust atrocities for fear of hurting 
their parents or discovering some shameful way in which 
their parents survived. The children fantasize about com­
pensating their parents and replacing lost relatives (for 
whom they are often named), and they struggle with the prob­
lem of identifying with and mourning for people they never 
knew. "Many of them spoke of an overwhelming burden of
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responsibility to fulfill their parents' needs and to 
replace dead siblings or other relatives." (p.104) Frey­
berg (1980) writes of similar patterns in which rage trig­
gered by unmet needs for emotional relatedness is repressed 
and a consuming concern for the well-being of the parents 
leads the child to assume responsibility for parental health 
and happiness. On both conscious and unconscious levels, 
notes Lipkowitz (1973), the children feel "After all they 
have been through, how can I hurt them any more?"(p.l47)
The children, then, strive for parental love and approval 
by being over-protective, by fulfilling the felt or stated 
expectations of their parents, by being good and successful 
and by trying to repress whatever anger they sense within 
themselves— and this in the context of anxiety ridden,sym­
biotic ambivalence caused by incomplete individuation.
The patient who came to our psychiatric service bore 
the scars not only of her schizophrenic illness, but also 
of the cataclysmic historical trauma of the Holocaust as 
experienced by her parents. Her developing the delusion 
of doubles can best be understood by object relations theory, 
but much of the content of her delusional system reflects 
the personal and cultural nightmare of terror and despair 
that had been the lot of her parents; and even the original 
disruptions in the mother-child relationship which laid 
the basis for the delusion are at least in part the result 
of the massive psychic trauma of survivors. I will now 
present the case material and follow with an object relations 
analysis.
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That Dr. F. 's parents suffered irreparable psychic 
harm can be assumed by extrapolating from the survivor 
syndrome— but I also obtained confirmation in the recol­
lections of Dr. F.’s cousin. The cousin described Dr. F.'s 
father as a "timid scholar-type" who spent his days "read­
ing at home in his slippers" and who "over-protected" his 
daughter; he described Dr. F.'s mother as a woman whose 
"spirit was broken during the war" and whose visits he 
dreaded because of her "morbid preoccupation with death 
and dying." Dr. F., by contrast, described her father as 
"an administrator type, organized, forthright,” and de­
scribed her mother as "a homemaker, kind and helpful."
The cousin described Dr. F.'s home as dark and dreary; 
the parents as apprehensive, fearful, and mistrustful; Dr.
F. as a child as isolated, aloof, and lonely. Dr. F. de­
scribed a "happy, stable home." The small apartment in 
which Dr. F. lived with her parents was in an old building 
in a decaying neighborhood; for ten or fifteen years pre­
ceding her hospitalization with us, Dr. F. and her parents 
were the only Jewish family in the area and the only English- 
speaking people in the building. Dr. F. once said, "I 
was always considered an adult— and I did not have equivo­
cal feelings— I wasn’t a child per se. . ." In four months 
of hospitalization she mentioned only one childhood experi­
ence of pleasure: a birthday party when she was eight— but 
she was unable to recall the names of any of the playments 
she'd invited. Speaking of her school years, she said,
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"I was a model student." I know from her cousin that she 
worked at after-school jobs from the time she was thirteen 
by passing for eighteen; I know too that she was regarded 
as odd by schoolmates, even at the special public school 
for exceptionally bright children to which she was admitted. 
Withdrawn, isolated, and lonely, living with morbid, pre­
occupied, psychically scarred parents in a dingy apartment 
in a decaying neighborhood; diligent, hard-working and in­
telligent, aloof, arrogant, and with touches of grandiosity—  
this is the picture of Dr. F.'s childhood I obtained from 
her cousin and uncle. It is the picture of a fragile, 
brittle, withdrawn young woman, a young woman described by 
her cousin as "a pre-morbid personality, a grandiose per­
sonality."
After graduating from her prestigeous high school, Dr.
F. attended a public college and subsequently enrolled in 
a local medical school. About the time of her graduation 
her father died. She said that she had been at his bedside 
when he died but had had no special reaction: "He was sim­
ply deceased." She spent an internship year on the West 
Coast and it was there that psychological problems seem to 
have become manifest. She referred vaguely to difficulties 
working under the supervision of others, but refused to 
elaborate. She returned East for a residency in opthamo- 
logy and encountered real difficulty. She reported that 
she got into trouble because she made comments about sexual
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behavior in a discussion with other residents, comments 
that were maliciously misinterpreted to her supervisors.
Her cousin told me that she had begun then to hear voices, 
that her then-boyfriend had concluded she was too "odd" 
and there had been an "acrimonious break." Shortly there­
after Dr. F, left the residency program.
Somewhere in this period Dr. F.’s mother attempted 
suicide by hanging. Dr. F. said that she had cut her 
mother down, but the story is confused. Dr. F. did obtain 
a second year residency at an Ivy League institution and 
it was there that the psychosis became virulent. Dr. F. 
claimed that her problems started because "I was too per­
fect. . ." She apparently stood up during lectures to de­
nounce people. He cousin, a resident in the same city at 
the time, was called and he reports arriving to find Dr.
F. "on all fours” listening to the sounds from the radia­
tor. She was taken to New York and hospitalized for the 
first time. That summer she traveled to India to seek a 
residency, but returned home, unsuccessful, in the fall.
She then went to a western state to seek a residency. She 
was arrested there for theft of service after refusing to 
pay a hotel bill. Her uncle wired money to the hotel and 
arranged for transportation back to New York, but Dr. F. 
flew instead to a southern city. There was again trouble 
with police, and this time the uncle flew down and took 
Dr. F. from what he called "a hang out place," what the 
cousin called "a brothel." There followed a period of
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hospitalizations and arrests. Dr. F. declared that it was 
in 1975 that her uncle was killed and replaced by a double, 
but he reported that she confronted him directly with this 
belief only three years later, in 1978, during a long stay 
in a state hospital to which she was "abducted."
Just before Dr. F.'s stay in the state hospital her 
mother had to be hospitalized again after what the uncle 
described as months of refusing to eat, change clothes, or 
leave the house. The mother was discharged to a nursing 
home. While at the state hospital Dr. F. refused to eat 
and at one time was tube fed. While out on a "groundspass” 
she left the hospital. Dr. F. met a man with whom she lived 
for five weeks until voices told her that he had been re­
placed by a double and she left his apartment. For several 
days, she said, she picked up men on the streets, "indulging 
in sodomy for money." She decided to seek hospitalization 
because her voices told her that the "psychologist film- 
directors" were planning to put her into films of sexual 
exploitation: there would be "dogs upon my naked person," 
she would be "forced to eat my own excrement," and they 
would "insert huge dildoes into my vagina." She came into 
my care, then, to escape the sadistic tortures she antici­
pated .
As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Dr. F. 
told a story of her mother's "recent death." I now believe 
she told that story to gain admission and thus "safety" 
from her persecutors. In hospital she soon revealed her
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genuine belief which proved resistant to both antipsychotic 
medication and to psychotherapy. Dr. F. informed us early, 
"I am not a paranoid schizophrenic with a delusional system,' 
adding condescendingly, "It's very complicated, you wouldn't 
understand.” She did enact at least part of what she had 
described as her behavior just prior to hospitalization by 
suggesting to the Director of In-patient Psychiatry and 
later to her social worker that they engage with her in 
sodomy.
Dr. F. began to ask for discharge within a week of ad­
mission, claiming "all is well.” When it appeared that 
long-term care would be required she began to increase her 
participation in ward activities,.asking the dance thera­
pist to be sure to note in the chart that she had "partici­
pated fully" and telling her nurse "I want you to see that 
my personal perimeters are in good order." She was able, 
under the threat of involuntary long-term hospitalization, 
to convince the Director that she was aware she had delu­
sions and was able to control them, and to tell her thera­
pist she understood she had "irrational fears." Within a 
few days of convincing staff that she was able to recog­
nize and control the delusion, she horrified a young woman 
medical student, who had a noticeable physical handicap 
herself, with an account of the tortures she was sure she 
would undergo: they were going to "stenose" her intestines, 
cut out her eyes, and shove hair brushes into her vagina; 
her teeth were to be pulled out without anesthesia, her
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legs were to be cut off in slices, and they were going to 
create "a huge anal-vaginal fistula;" she would be beaten 
with broomsticks, her head would be twisted to the side 
and her vertebrae fused, and rubber male genitals would be 
surgically attached, making her "appear a hermaphrodite."
The delusion of doubles displayed typical forms remini­
scent of Capgras' first patient, as well as some particular 
elaborations. The principal double was that of her mother, 
and Dr. F. could give the exact date— July 4, 1974— when 
her mother had been "killed.” That time coincides roughly 
with the period of her trip to India, the time also when 
she demanded more money for the trip from her mother and 
the mother for the first time refused. Her uncle, she said, 
had been killed a year later, at the time when he was in­
volved in getting her admitted to the state hospital. Af­
ter some six weeks in hospital she declared that her thera­
pist had been replaced by an imposter; shortly thereafter 
she declared the social worker a double as well. Toward 
the end of her stay with us, as preparations were begun for 
her transfer to a state facility, she asserted that there 
were doubles of everyone on the floor, and indeed that there 
was an identical, mirror image world on the other side of 
our locked doors.
Dr. F. spoke also of doubles of herself. One double, 
who had collected the five hundred million dollars was on 
a "cruise to nowhere" taking Dr. F.'s place, because Dr. F.
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was "channeled for the Presidency." (When questioned some 
time later about the significance and responsibility of 
the Presidency, Dr. F. said that it was really the Vice- 
Presidency for which she was headed— first.) The second 
double of herself, she said, was in other areas of the hos­
pital getting Dr. F. into trouble— by indulging in sexual 
activity with male staff members and biting their penises 
to convince people that Dr. F. was homosexual. Both of
these doubles were part of the plot of the "film director-
psyehologists" of the original "psychoanalytic study," but 
she was the "real" Dr. F. and could prove it by identify­
ing people in photographs whom only the real Dr. F. could 
have known. She begged us to contact the President and 
the Mayor (and I believe she wrote letters to the Presi­
dent) but she also said that if we were to let her meet
the Mayor we’d probably put in a double of him too.
Dr. F. responded to antipsychotic medication by gaining 
more control over the outpour of her delusional system, but 
not, it seems, over the delusions themselves. When she had 
convinced staff that she could control her delusions, we 
began to plan for discharge. (We had also sought legal 
consultation and had been told that we needed to try less 
restrictive forms of treatment before considering involun­
tary long-term care.) We were exploring a "half-way house" 
for residence and a day-treatment center for out-patient 
therapy when, on a day pass she was supposed to use to 
attend the day center, Dr. F. was stopped from climbing
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into the East River. She denied suicidal intent but re­
fused to explain the incident other than to say there had 
been "a misunderstanding." She had withdrawn money from 
her bank accounts and sent thousands of dollars, unowed, 
to the Internal Revenue Service; she had over $9,000 in 
cash and bank checks on her person. Clearly, long-term 
care was required, and we began proceedings. A few days 
later, now restricted to our locked ward and on fifteen 
minute checks, Dr. F. committed suicide by drowning herself 
in the bathtub.
Dr. F.'s delusional system of doubles reflects, I be­
lieve, a pathology of internalized object relations which 
lay dormant until activated by the onset of her schizo­
phrenic illness and which was precipitated by the alterca­
tion with her mother over money early in her illness.
Both the evidence I obtained from her uncle and cousin and 
the research literature on Holocaust survivors point toward 
the kind of mother-child interaction that would lead to 
pathological splitting of internalized object representa­
tions. For example, Dr. F.'s uncle told me that her mother 
was obsessed by the thought that she had sacrificed her 
son in order to save her own life. As has already been 
mentioned, Holocaust survivors who lost children seem to 
have been especially beset by guilt. We know that Mrs. F. 
was morbid and brooding, dispirited, a shadow of the active, 
effective professional she had been before the war. It
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seems reasonable to suppose that she, like so many sur­
vivor mothers, was emotionally unavailable, anxious, watch­
ful, and mistrustful. I can hypothesize that the earliest, 
split internalized object representations were never inte­
grated, and the split-off "bad" mother images lay dormant 
in the unconscious while an idealized "good" mother image 
was tenaciously maintained. Dr. F. always described her 
parents in a totally positive light: her parents were per­
fectly good, there were never any family problems, she had 
an ideal childhood.
Her illness seems to have begun during her internship 
year— at the time, significantly, of her first separation 
from home. The delusion of doubles came, she indicated, 
about two years later— at least she dated her mother's 
"death" at that time. The precipitating event seems to 
have been an argument over money as Dr. F. erratically 
sought residency programs. Dr. F. demanded money from her 
mother, the mother refused. Dr. F. struck her mother 
during this argument; indeed, it was a discussion of this 
incident which first uncovered the delusion of doubles.
When asked, early in her hospitalization, if she had ever 
been angry at her mother, she replied, "Yes." Did they 
ever fight? "No comment ...yes...the real E.F. hit her 
mother, not this one. . .no, it was the false E.F. who hit 
her mother, not me. . .1 sound like a paranoid schizophrenic 
with a split personality, but I'm not." A day later she 
said, "E.F. is not proud of hitting her mother," and added
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later, "The false E.F. hit her mother. . .the true E.F. 
struck an imposter mother.” The altercation, I believe, 
stimulated an upsurge of rage at the mother, rage which 
elicited the previously unconscious, aggressively charged 
"bad" mother images. At the same time there occurred a 
marked affective shift in which Dr. F. wondered, shocked,
that her mother had refused her "My mother wouldn’t
refuse me, how can this be happening?" The affective 
strangeness combined with the unfamiliar rage and its con- 
commitant anxiety, guilt, and fear and with the formerly 
dissociated "bad" mother image produced first a feeling 
that "this can’t be my mother," then the delusion that 
there was an imposter mother, a malevolent, frustrating 
person who rightly warranted the anger. Once the delusion 
of the first double was accepted, other important people, 
especially as they too frustrated Dr. F., would "logically" 
become part of the system. Dr. F.'s uncle, for example, 
was told he was a double at the time he was arranging Dr. 
F.’s commitment to a state hospital. The man with whom Dr. 
F. lived for several weeks after leaving the state hospital 
became a double only when he began worrying about her and 
attempted to contact her family. The belief that her thera­
pist had a double developed only after discussions began 
about long-term care, and the social worker was replaced 
only when he refused to facilitate her effort to obtain 
a new Social Security number under a false name. The para­
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broad plot, but only the pathological process of splitting 
of representations adequately describes the allegations 
of replacement by doubles.
Doubles of the self seem less common in Capgras' Syn­
drome than doubles of others (although Capgras' first 
patient believed there were doubles of herself,as did the 
patient of Dupouy and Montassut). I have noted eight cases 
in the English reports (see Appendix) in which the delusion 
included doubles of the self. Again, an object relations 
perspective may serve to help us understand that phenomenon. 
Just as internalized images of the mother were split, so 
too were self-images. The narcissistic, idealized self- 
images— the "model student," the "too perfect" resident—  
were consciously held and fiercely maintained. (Dr. F.'s 
cousin said she had as a young woman always been "aloof" 
and "grandiose;" she could, even when I knew her, be re­
markably condescending.) As illness took hold and she 
felt herself changing, and as she encountered rejection 
in her search for a residency, she protected that idealized 
image by asserting the existence of doubles. The second 
double, the imposter she believed was sexually active in 
the hospital in order to get her into trouble, represented 
projected aspects of the "bad" self-representations which 
had originally been split and repressed but which returned 
to consciousness in the course of the schizophrenic illness.
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Conscious but unacceptable, those "bad" attributes could 
be externalized and disavowed in the form of a second 
double, the imposter biting penises.
An additional dimension in the "choice” of the delusion 
of doubles may have come from the family tragedy: Dr. F.'s 
brother was "dead" but probably alive, somewhere in Eastern 
Europe, unaware himself of his true identity; and Dr. F.'s 
father had been declared "dead” in order to return him to 
life with his wife. Dr. F. was aware of the family story, 
although she professed little interest in her parents' 
suffering. I wonder too whether some of her fantasies of 
torture she expected to undergo were derived from Nazi 
"medical experiments" about which she may have known. (See 
Trials of War Criminals. . . , 1946-1949.) Indeed, when I 
expressed some sympathy for her parents, Dr. F. replied,
"It’s what happened to them, not to me— for me it’s much 
worse: no one has ever undergone such torture as I will 
undergo.” It may have been fear of those tortures, which 
she expected to occur should she be sent to a state hospital, 
which drove her to take her own life.
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IV
The Delusion of Doubles 
in Broader Context
The delusion of doubles is frightening, yet familiar.
It is alien and horrifying, yet we somehow recognize its 
closeness to ourselves. It is uncanny. "The uncanny," 
wrote Freud (1919), "is that class of the terrifying which 
leads back to something long known to us, once very fami­
liar . "(p. 369) To understand the delusion of doubles ade­
quately, we must acknowledge its familiar as well as its 
frightening aspects; we must seek to set the delusion into 
the context of normal and neurotic phenomena, as well as 
to describe it in its psychotic extreme. We must search, 
then, for phenomena in the broad range of human experience 
which can offer fuller understanding of the origins of the 
ideas of doubles and the expression of those ideas in normal 
life, in neurotic distress, and in the creativity of fiction 
as well. Only such a contextual effort can provide the 
necessary beginning for the understanding of the phenomenon 
and for psychotherapeutic treatment of its devastating 
pathological form.
There must be both intra-psychic experiences and en­
vironmental-experiential factors to give shape to the idea
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of doubles. The object-relations theory approach I have 
suggested may provide the necessary intra-psychic patterns 
for the delusion of doubles. There are patterns as well 
in normal human interactions and experiences. The obvious 
experiential templates for the delusion of doubles are twins, 
family resemblances, chance similarities in appearance, 
and shadows and reflections. Crawley (1914) discusses the 
importance in many primitive cultures of shadows and re­
flections as images of the soul, and of the belief in an­
cient Egypt and elsewhere that the soul is an identical 
image of the body, released at death or, in some cultures, 
at sleep. To cast no shadow or no reflection would be 
to be soul-less. (In the film "Dracula," van Helsing con­
firms his belief that the count is a vampire by noting his 
lack of reflection in a mirror.) Identical twins are start­
ling, and there are often "look-alike" contests seeking 
doubles of prominent figures in politics or entertainment.
Ordinary language hints at a familiar toying with 
questions of identity and identical images. We say, "I 
am not myself today," or "He was beside himself." When 
startled by an uncharacteristic act by a well-known person 
we may ask, incredulously, "How could he, of all people, 
do something like that?," and we might even add, "It can’t 
be he!" We speak of people putting up a "false front” 
and often say of others (or feel of ourselves) that it is 
possible to live a "double life." Capgras, Lucchini, and 
Schiff (1925) asked, "Who among us has not happened to
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encounter a friend having changed in some commonplace way
the habitual aspect of his appearance and said to ourself
'This is not he, as I know him, but someone who resembles
him greatly. . .'?"(p.214) Indeed, some of us may have
acted in our lives much like Doestoevsky's Golyadkin in
The Double (1866). Golyadkin, riding in a rented carriage,
a mode of transportation far above his station as a clerk,
passes his department head, also, but appropriately in his
case, in a carriage.
Seeing that concealment was quite out of the question 
since Andrey Filippovich, having recognized him, was 
now staring hard at him, his eyes nearly popping out 
of his head, Mr. Golyadkin coloured up to his ears.
"Shall I bow? Shall I make some response? Shall 
I admit it's me, or shan't I?" thought our hero in 
indescribable anguish. "Or shall I pretend it's not 
me, but someone extraordinarily like me, and just 
look as if nothing had happened? It really isn't me, 
it isn't me, and that's all there is to it," said 
Mr. Golyadkin, raising his hat to Andrey Filippovich 
and not taking his eyes off him. (p.IS)
Experiences such as that of Golyadkin seem quite familiar 
and understandable, for who has not wished at some time or 
other to be recognized not as himself but to be taken only 
as someone looking very much the same?
There is an extensive literature on the concept of the 
double in fiction. (See Guerard, 1967; Rogers, 1970; Rosen- 
field, 1963; and T y m m s , 1949, for example.) Literary cri­
ticism uses the term "double" with a far broader defini­
tion that I would suggest is useful. The double, for the 
literary critics, includes the autoscopic image, the iden­
tical look-alike, and a wide range of non-similar charac­
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ters who can be seen as foils to the protagonist, repre­
senting hidden dimensions of his personality or projected 
fragments of his shattered psyche. Critics like Rogers 
(1970), for example, tend to see most conflict as intra­
psychic, with various characters representing ego, id, and 
superego and with Oedipal dramas as the heart of literary 
imagination. It is important to bear in mind this wide 
definition of doubles when considering the possible con­
tributions of fiction to our understanding of Capgras* Syn­
drome, for while literary usage does illuminate the delu­
sion of doubles, it is not directly analogous.
Rosenfield (1963) notes that from the Classical world 
through the Renaissance doubles were used as either divert­
ing look-alikes in comedy or as instructional, allegorical 
opposities in morality plays. The Romantics, she notes, 
used doubles in fairy tales, but only moderns deliberately 
use the structure of the double to portray ". . .the con­
flict between the conscious and the unconscious life, the 
constant menace of personal disintegration which apparently 
threatens us all, and the loss of identity consequent both 
upon mental disorder and the necessity that the character 
mask his internal life by creating roles to play."(p.343)
Perhaps the most famous use of doubles in Classical 
literature occurs in Amphitryon, by Plautus (ca.200B.C.)
In the prologue Mercury tells the essentials of the play, 
and the outline of the original Greek myth.
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He /Jove/ began carrying on an affair with Alcmena 
behind her husband’s /Amphitryon’s/ back. He borrowed 
her husband’s looks for_himself, made love to her, 
and made her pregnant /with Hercules/ on his own. I 
want you to get Alcmena's situation straight: she’s 
pregnant by both of them, by her husband and by al­
mighty Jove. . . .I’ve changed myself to look like 
Sosia, Amphitryon's servant, who's off at the front 
with his master, (p.5)
The action of the play takes off as the real Amphitryon 
returns home from war with his real servant, Sosia. Mari­
tal strife and the multiple beatings of Sosia provide the 
occasion for comedy. At one point Sosia, desperate but con­
vinced that there are two of him, insists to Amphitryon,
"I tell you I'm in that house over there and also beside 
you here."(p.31) A happy ending is achieved when Jove re­
veals his adventures to Amphitryon and all the mortal be­
ings are reconciled.
Shakespeare's A Comedy of Errors (1593?) also uses 
the device of doubles to achieve comedic effects. Again 
both masters and servants are doubled, in this case by two 
serts of identical twins, separated in infancy and brought 
together, unknowingly, in maturity. Wives and servants, 
friends and creditors are confused, servants are beaten, 
and devoted wives are maligned and disheartened until, at 
last, the two sets of twins are finally brought together 
at the end of the play. Confronted with two sets of con­
fusing identical twins put before him, the Dpke of Ephesus 
asks:
One of these men is genius to the other;
And so of these. Which is the natural man,
And which the spirit? Who deciphers them?
(Act V, scene i)
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All is explained, and all forgiven, as reunited families 
recognize their kinship, and fears of enchantment, of 
magical bewitching, vanish as the natural twinship is re­
vealed.
As Plautus toys with divine dissemblance and Shake­
speare employs twins, other authors utilize other forms of 
doubling in their works. I will discuss briefly several 
of the works which seem most useful in thinking about the 
delusion of doubles. Andersen's fairy tale "The Shadow" 
(1835?/1936) uses the notion of the shadow as double and 
also introduces the theme of the double taking over the 
original. In Andersen’s story a student from a cold 
northern country visits a hotter southern country. A 
vision of a beautiful maiden on the balcony across the 
street prompts the student to send his shadow into her 
dwelling— and the shadow does not return. The student 
"returned to his cold fatherland and he wrote books about 
all that was true, and good, and beautiful in the world,"
(p.341) but one day he was visited by his shadow, a shadow 
grown solid, knowing, and powerful. The student asked the 
shadow where he had been and what he had learned.
'I saw the most incredible, unheard-of things among 
all ranks and classes. I saw,' continued the shadow 
emphatically, ’what none must know, but all would 
so much like to know— their neighbors* secret evil 
deeds.’(p.345)
The now rich shadow convinces the student to act as his 
shadow, indeed shows off his intelligent "shadow" as a 
way to win favor with the rich and the aristocratic.
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When the shadow has won the hand of a princess, the 
scholar tries to stop the deceit, but the shadow, de­
claring "My shadow has become crazy,"(p.350) has the 
scholar imprisoned and killed.
Two stories by Guy de Maupassant describe phenomena 
related to the sense of being taken over by a "double."
In "The Horla,"(1880s/1923) the narrator wonders if there 
are two beings dwelling within him and declares, "Some­
body possesses my soul and governs it. Somebody orders 
all my acts, all my movements, all my thoughts."(p.249) 
Determined to destroy the evil presence, the narrator
burns down his house, then realizes that the presence is
still with him— to destroy it he must kill himself. In 
"He"(1880s/1923) the narrator decides he must marry, not 
because he is in love but because he is frightened of being 
alone. ". . .I am afraid of myself, afraid of that horrible 
sensation of incomprehensible fear. . .Above all, I am 
afraid of my own dreadful thoughts, of my reason, which 
seems as if it were about to leave me, driven away by a
mysterious and invisible agony."(p.154) The narrator wan­
ders in the streets to escape his terrifying aloneness, 
and on entering his apartment notices a figure sitting in 
his chair— but he touches the figure, and no one is there. 
Maupassant himself apparently experienced autoscopic pheno­
mena (see Todd and Dewhurst,1955), and the narrator of this 
story becomes obsessed with the idea of seeing "him"(self)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
again, obsessed to the point of being convinced that if 
he were to marry this other self would not reappear.
The idea of a "double," dangerous and different from 
the surface, social self, takes poignant form in Stevenson’s 
"Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" (1886/1879). The inner, hidden 
demonic persona of Mr. Hyde exerts an irresistible pres­
sure to emerge, and in emerging overwhelms the civilized 
Dr. Jekyll. "All things therefore seemed to point to this: 
that I was slowly losing hold of my original and better 
self, and becoming slowly incorporated with my second and 
worse."(p.89) In the chapter entitled "Henry Jekyll's 
Full Statement of the Case," Stevenson has Dr. Jekyll re­
veal the history of his disastrous experiment. The por­
trait of a soul divided is apt and moving.
I was born in the year 18__ to a large fortune, en­
dowed besides with excellent parts, inclined by nature 
to industry, fond of the respect of the wise and good 
among my fellow-men, and thus, as might have been sup­
posed, with every guarantee of an honorable and dis­
tinguished future. And indeed, the worst of my faults 
was a certain impatient gaiety of disposition, such 
as has made the happiness of many, but such as I found 
it hard to reconcile with my imperious desire to carry 
my head high, and wear a more than commonly grave coun­
tenance before the public. Hence it came about that 
I concealed my pleasures; and that when I reached years 
of reflection, and began to look round me and take 
stock of my progress and position in the world, I 
stood already committed to a profound duplicity of 
life. Many a man would have even blazoned such irre­
gularities as I was guilty of; but from the high views 
that I had set before me, I regarded and hid them with 
an almost morbid sense of shame. It was thus rather 
the exacting nature of my aspirations, than any par­
ticular degradation in my faults, that made me what I 
was and, with even a deeper trench than in the majority 
of men, severed in me those provinces of good and ill 
which divide and compound man’s dual nature. In this 
case, I was driven to reflect deeply and inveterately
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on that hard law of life which lies at the root of 
religion, and is one of the most plentiful springs 
of distress. Though so profound a double-dealer, I 
was in no sense a hypocrite: both sides of me were in 
dead earnest; I was no more myself when I laid aside 
restraint and plunged in shame, than when I labored, 
in the eye of day, at the furtherance of knowledge or 
the relief of sorrow and suffering.(p.81)
Dr. Jekyll struggled, then, not to repress one or the 
other aspect of himself, but rather to separate the two, 
so that each part might pursue its own natural inclinations. 
We feel, with Jekyll, the torment of his divided self, for 
we can easily recognize in ourselves the conflicts of im­
pulse and prohibition.
Poe's short story "William Wilson"(1839/1950) presents 
one of the few literary accounts of an identical double 
of the self, and thus a clearer analogue to one form of 
Capgras’ Syndrome. Poe’s narrator opens with mention of 
his "later years of unspeakable misery and unpardonable 
crime,"(p.39) thus setting a contemporary frame around in­
cidents from his past. As a child, says the narrator, he 
was "self-willed, addicted to the wildest caprices, and 
a prey to the most ungovernable passions."(p.40) To his 
school came a new boy, a boy who shared his rather common 
name. The namesake provokes anxiety in the narrator, but 
his feelings are mixed.
They formed a motley and heterogeneous admixture—  
some petulant animosity, which was not yet hatred, 
some esteem, more respect, much fear, with a world 
of uneasy curiosity. To the moralist it will be un­
necessary to say, in addition, that Wilson and my­
self were the most inseparable of companions.(p.45)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
The namesake imitates the narrator in dress, gesture,
voice, and manner and takes on a patronizing role, the
role of the giver of moral advice. The moral interference 
of the double continues at Eton, when the narrator is 
drunk and carousing but the double appears and produces 
instant sobriety. Again, at Oxford, as the narrator is 
cheating at cards the double appears and the fraud is ex­
posed. Forced to leave Oxford, the narrator flees to the
Continent, but at each moment of crime or debauchery the 
double appears ". . .to frustrate those actions which, if 
fully carried out, might have resulted in bitter mischief." 
(p.57) Indeed, the narrator, while frustrated, nonetheless 
feels "deep awe" as he regards "the majestic wisdom, the 
apparent omnipresence and omnipotence of Wilson. . ."(p.58) 
At last, in Rome, as the double frustrates a seduction, 
the narrator is driven to a final rage and, drawing his 
sword, runs the double through. He then beholds
mine own image, but with features all pale and dab­
bled in blood. . .It was Wilson; but he spoke no long­
er in a whisper, and I could have fancied that I my­
self was speaking when he said:"You have conquered, 
and I yield. Yet, hence forward art thou also dead—  
dead to the World, to Heaven, and to Hope! In me didst
thou exist— and, in my death, see by this image, which
is thine own, how utterly thou hast murdered thyself!" 
( P . 60)
In the killing of the double, of the moral self, all hope
dies. The double’s last words return the reader to the
narrator’s opening lines:
Oh outcast of all outcasts most abandoned!— to the 
earth art thou not forever dead? to its honors,
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to its flowers, to its golden aspirations?— and 
a cloud, dense, dismal, and limitless, does it not 
hang eternally between thy hopes and heaven?(p.39)
For the narrator Wilson, as for Dr. Jekyll, all hope fades 
when the self-observing moral agency succumbs to the un­
bridled passions.
Poe makes two observations which are striking in the 
context of Capgras’ Syndrome. First, he shows how the mo­
ral, self-observing agency, the superego, is both admired 
and resented, and how the "good" and "bad" in conflict can 
become unstuck. Once "inseparable companions," the narrator 
and the double become increasingly dissociated. But per­
haps these aspects of the self were never fully bound in 
William Wilson, and this is the second point to note. The 
narrator recalls an altercation with his double at school 
and remembers:
. . .1 discovered, or fancied I discovered, in his 
accent, in his air, and general appearance, a some­
thing which first startled, then deeply interested 
me, by bringing to mind dim visions of my earliest 
infancy— wild, confused and thronging memories of 
a time when memory herself was yet unborn. I cannot 
better describe the sensation which oppressed me than 
by saying that I could with difficulty shake off the 
belief of my having been acquainted with the being who 
stood before me, at some epoch very long ago— some 
point of the past infintely remote.(p.49)
Poe seems to allude here to an obscure awareness of the
tumultuous images of split good and bad self-representations,
images of warring affect, recognizable but irreconcilable;
images split and dissociated, images never cohering and
thus always susceptible to fragmenting.
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If Poe delineates an ultimate dissolution of poorly 
integrated self-representations, Joseph Conrad, in "The 
Secret Sharer”(caI902/1981) presents a study of reintegra­
tion of dissociated aspects of the self. Conrad's narra­
tor takes his first command of a sailing ship, feeling 
some prescient intimation of an arduous enterprise to come. 
"But what I felt most,” he says, "was my being a stranger 
to the ship; and if the truth must be told, I was somewhat 
of a stranger to myself."(p.138) New to the position of 
command, new to the ship, the narrator is as unknown to 
his crew as they to him. "They /the crew/ had simply to 
be equal to their tasks; but I wondered how far I should 
turn out faithful to that ideal conception of one's own 
personality every man sets up for himself secretly."(p.138) 
Ruminating on deck in the stillness of the tropical air, 
the captain reveals a bit of how he happened— how he chose?—  
to become a stranger to himself.
And suddenly I rejoiced in the great security of the 
sea as compared with the unrest of the land, in my 
choice of that untempted life presenting no disquieting 
problems, invested with an elementary moral beauty by 
the absolute straightforwardness of its appeal and by 
the singleness of its purpose.(p.141)
In his first act as captain, the narrator takes a watch on 
deck— then worries what effect his untraditional behavior 
will have on his crew. And then the security and elemen­
tary moral beauty of the sea are broken.
The captain spots Leggatt floating naked by the side 
of the ship, speaks to him, and brings him secretly aboard.
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The captain notes a subtle change in himself, a change 
somehow stimulated by the words of Leggatt: "The voice was 
calm and resolute. A good voice. The self-possession of 
that man had somehow induced a corresponding state in my­
self, (p. 144) The captain frequently notes that he and Leg­
gatt do not look alike, yet just as frequently, and often 
in the same sentence, calls Leggatt his "double" or his 
"other self." Leggatt has escaped from imprisonment on his 
own ship: he had, in a fit of temper, killed a man who was 
endangering the entire ship. The murder was not intended, 
the victim was a worthless, surly fellow, but a crime was 
done; Leggatt, imprisoned, chose escape over trial. For 
the irresolute captain listening to the determined Leggatt, 
"It was, in the night, as though I had been faced by my 
own reflection in the depths of a somber and immense mir­
ror, "(p. 146) The captain hides Leggatt in his cabin, 
clothes him, feeds him— and by his unusual behavior further 
strains relations with his crew. To give Leggatt the best 
chance to escape the captain brings his ship dangerously 
close to an island shore; now resolute himself, he holds 
his course, leaves Leggatt to his freedom and his fate, 
and catches at last the off-shore wind that moves his ship 
to safety. For Conrad's captain, Leggatt, the secret shar­
er, represents the untested, dissociated aspects of himself. 
In the crisis of hiding a wanted criminal the captain sees 
dimensions of himself in the other and allows those hidden 
parts to rejoin the functioning self.
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Doestoevsky’s short novel The Double (1866/1958) pre­
sents the story of a petty clerk tormented by his double.
At the beginning of the story it is clear that Golyadkin 
is in the process of psychotic decompensation. He spends 
inordinate time in narcissistic preoccupation before the 
mirror, suffers from vague paranoid delusions and ideas of 
reference, endures periods of agitation, and acts inappro­
priately. Like William Wilson, Golyadkin initially feels 
warmly toward his double: "Mr. Golyadkin felt no hatred, 
enmity or even the slightest unfriendliness towards him—  
quite the reverse, it would seem."(p.79) The double works 
in the same office, gradually usurping Golyadkin’s position, 
turning colleagues against him, and causing mischief and 
ridicule. Golyadkin questions the reality of the double, 
even sees his doctor, but his illness grows and his frantic 
efforts to assert himself bring even more disastrous re­
sponses. Eventually he is carried away to an asylum at 
the direction of his doctor: "This wasn't Dr. Rutenspitz!
Who was it? Or was it him? It was! Not the earlier Dr. 
Rutenspitz, but another, a terrible Dr. Rutenspitz!"(p.254) 
Perhaps Golyadkin displays here the process of generaliza­
tion of the delusion of doubles noted in several case re­
ports mentioned above, as the belief in one persecuting 
double expands to include belief that others too have been 
impersonated. The double here represents what Golyadkin 
wishes he himself were like: the double is younger, more 
charming, more socially adroit and socially accepted.
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The double while imbued with "good" attributes none- 
the less foils the original, as do nearly all doubles 
reported in the clinical literature.
Doubles in literature seem then to appear in a num­
ber of forms: the felt but unseen "possessor;" the seen 
identical image; the seen but distinctly different- 
appearing image representing a divided aspect of the self. 
Each of these works is the story of a double of a self, 
not a story of doubles of others. (There are also, of 
course, stories of identical twins, known and unknown to 
each other, who represent good and evil; there are 
"science fiction" stories of duplication, like "Invasion 
of the Body Snatchers," but these latter seem usually of 
a "lower order" of literary endeavor, romances, adventures, 
or thrillers.) The general pattern in these works of 
fiction emphasizes the "trench" in Jekyll’s words, cited 
above, which severs "those provinces of good and ill which 
divide and compound man's dual nature." The double seems 
usually to possess some dissociated, split-off aspects of 
the self, aspects often charged with unbridled passion, as 
with Jekyll or Andersen's scholar, though at times repre­
senting acceptable characteristics (Leggatt) or conscience 
(William Wilson). The double is usually capable of obser­
ving the original, of knowing all about him, and of judging 
him. Often then, the double seems to represent some notion 
of a superego, either in its critically judgmental aspect 
of conscience (William Wilson) or, less frequently, in its
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more benevolent aspect as ego ideal (Leggatt).
I have tried to indicate the every-day ways (twins, 
reflections, etc.) in which the idea of doubles can become 
the theme of delusion and I have tried to present some of 
the expressions of that idea in works of fiction. But it 
is not only in delusion or fiction that the idea of doubles 
becomes lively, it is also in moments of our ordinary 
growth and development. I would like to present three 
sketches of Capgras-like phenomena in non-psychotic child­
ren to indicate something of the place of the idea of 
doubles in development. Two cases are of people I have 
encountered; one is discussed by Bruno Bettelheim.
Bettelheim, in his The Uses of Enchantment (1976), 
discusses the echoes in fairy tales of the splitting of 
object representations. When kind grandmother suddenly 
reprimands and humiliates the child for bedwetting, for 
example,
To the child, Grandma is no longer the same person 
she was a moment before; she has become an ogre. . . 
Unable to see any congruence between the different 
manifestations, the child truly experiences Grandma 
as two separate entities— the loving and the threat­
ening. She is indeed grandma and the wolf. By 
dividing her up, so to speak, the child can preserve 
his image of the good grandmother, (pp.66,67)
Splitting of one person into two in order to keep the good
image uncontaminated is a device not only of fairy tales,
but also of many children confronted with "a relationship
too difficult to manage or comprehend."(p.67) Bettelheim
tells of a college student who remembered an experience
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she had when aged five.
One day in a supermarket this girl's mother suddenly 
became very angry with her, and the girl felt utterly 
devastated that her mother could act this way toward 
her. On the walk home, her mother continued to scold 
her angrily, telling her she was no good. The girl 
became convinced that this vicious person only looked 
like her mother and, although pretending to be her, 
was actually an evil Martian, a look-alike impostor, 
who had taken away her mother and assumed her appear­
ance. From then on, the girl assumed on many different 
occasions that this Martian had abducted her mother 
and taken her place to torture the child as the real 
mother would never have done.
This fantasy went on for a couple of years until, 
when seven, the girl became courageous enough to try 
to set traps for the Martian. When the Martian had 
once again taken Mother's place to engage in its ne­
farious practice of torturing her, the girl would 
cleverly put some question to the Martian about what 
had happened between the real mother and herself. To 
her amazement, the Martian knew all about it, which at 
first just confirmed the Martian's cunning to the girl. 
But after two or three such experiments the girl be­
came doubtful; then she asked her mother about events 
which had taken place between the girl and the Martian. 
When it became obvious that her mother knew about 
these events, the fantasy of the Martian collapsed.(p.67)
Bettelheim concludes that at the time this girl needed to 
feel secure that her mother was totally good and thus in­
capable of inflicting such painful criticism, she was able 
to rearrange reality via the delusion of the Martian and 
so preserve her belief in her mother's total goodness.
When more secure in herself she was able to test the fan­
tasy and integrate the double image of her mother.
A similar quality of thought appeared in a three year 
old boy whom I met last summer. Just before I met him, his 
parents told me, he had begun to say things like "I don't 
want two daddies, a nice daddy and a nasty daddy." He seemed 
also to be having nightmares of "two daddies." (It should
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not be difficult to imagine the enthusiasm with which I 
responded to this encounter.) The boy offered little ad­
ditional data; he was very bright, but late in language 
acquisition. His vocabulary was limited and he was reluc­
tant to talk about these unsettling experiences. I did 
discover, however, that a few days before he first complained 
of two daddies his father had, for this first time, in­
flicted a corporal punishment, and the father acknowledged 
he had been in a towering rage at the child. The parallel 
to Bettelheim's girl is obvious. In both cases a sudden 
change of attitude on the part of a parent is so shocking, 
so alien, that it threatens the child’s entire world view 
and can "only" be explained by the "fact" that two persons, 
not one, are involved.
The second Capgras-like case I encountered was reported 
by a 24 year old college student who spontaneously recalled 
while in treatment that when he was about five he had begun 
to believe that his mother was occasionally replaced by an 
identical double. His conviction, he recalled, was com­
plete: on many occasions, roughly between his fifth and 
tenth years, his mother would leave home and an identical 
double would return. He knew it was a double because, 
even though identical, she felt different to him: she was 
hard, cold, angry; she treated him differently. Looking 
back, the young man realized that the delusion began short­
ly after his parents' divorce and occurred always after
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what must have been his mother’s going out on dates which 
went badly. Again the parallel with Bettelheim's case is 
clear. At a time when this boy especially needed the com­
plete support and security of a loving mother, her strained 
and changed demeanor could not be tolerated because of the 
risk it posed to his good image of her. The unpleasant 
mother, then, was believed to be a double, an impostor, a 
person who did not love him and whom, in turn, he could 
reject without losing his inner bond to his "real," loving 
mother.
The argument I have presented in this chapter tries to 
indicate that the Capgras’ Syndrome, the psychotic delusion 
of doubles, should appear not as a bizarre, exotic, alien 
entity, but rather as the extreme expression of phenomena 
familiar to us all. In our development as a species as well 
as our development as individuals we note the striking pos­
sibility of similarity in twins, reflections, and chance 
resemblances. Our literature is rich with the idea of 
doubles as comedic devices and allegorical reminders as 
well as in depictions of our potential for psychic dissolu­
tion and our capacity for doing ill as well as good. Our 
fairy tales enact the splitting up of good and bad, and echo 
the normal childhood devices of preserving good images by 
postulating bad impostors. (Folklore is rich with stories 
of "changelings," and as late as the early twentieth cen­
tury there are accounts of children left to die on dung- 
heaps because their parents believed they were changelings.
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/Briggs, 1967/) The "family romance" of the neurotic 
(Freud, 1909) portrays, according to both Bettelheim (1976) 
and Fenichel (1945) a similar if somewhat less dramatically 
conceived role. Rank (1909) notes also the presence of the 
family romance in myths of the birth of the hero. Freud 
(1909) compares the "family romance" to historical intrigues; 
indeed, in 1688 the birth of a potential Catholic successor 
to the throne of England brought with it a wide-spredd be­
lief that the infant was "supposititious,” a changeling 
in the royal family. (See Berson, 1968) Folklore and his­
tory, then, echo literature and psychoanalytic theory.
The three cases sketches I have presented in this context 
should, I hope, convey in yet another way the familiarity 
with which we ought to greet the notion of doubles.
Perhaps a more familiar response to Dr. F.'s delusion 
of doubles would have made possible some real treatment.
It is hard to know. Certainly by the time I met her, her 
disease had taken a heavy toll, the delusion of doubles 
and the fear of mutilating torture preoccupied her totally. 
Earlier, perhaps, some recognition of the syndrome, some 
sense of its relation to us all, might have fostered better 
care. It is my hope that this discussion of the delusion 
of doubles may help engender a better response to those 
who suffer it. Those authors who posit potential organic 
causes for the syndrome urge greater diligence in organic 
work-ups. I would urge as well greater attention to early 
object relations, to one-sided images of self and others,
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and to interpersonal experiences of sudden, startling 
changes in emotionally rich relationships. If the idea 
of doubles is, as I have tried to demonstrate, a more 
familiar, understandable phenomenon than we had thought, 
it is nonetheless most horrifying, cruel, and awful when 
it takes psychotic form. What is richness in literary 
metaphor, what is transitionally adaptive in childhood 
dilemmas, what brings mirthful confusion in drama or twin- 
play, is also capable of wreaking devastation and tragic 
destruction as Capgras' Syndrome, the delusion of doubles.
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Appendix
Cases of Capgras’ Syndrome 
Reported in English
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